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akin to Muhammad Ali's famous "rope-a-dope." The Lecture's tour d'horizon
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used to blunt Trump's early initiatives across a broad array of issue areas.
While this counter-strategy has been wearing, the Lecture concludes that the
high stakes make continuing the struggle both worthwhile and necessary.
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It is a pleasure to deliver this Foulston Siefkin Lecture here at Washburn
School of Law in Topeka, Kansas, the historic scene of Brown v. Board of
Education.1 I was born the year Brown was decided, and my career has since
divided into four lifestreams: thirty-five years as a law professor; nearly thirty
as a human rights lawyer; five as a Dean; and ten in the United States gov-
ernment, serving in the Reagan Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel,
then in the Clinton and Obama Administrations' State Departments, first as
Madeleine Albright's Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor and later as Hillary Clinton's Legal Adviser. As a supporter of Secre-
tary Clinton for President, I obviously did not vote for our current President,
but neither do I wish him ill. But I do expect him to follow his oath, which is
to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States
of America. These include the President's constitutional duty to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed, including certain rules of international law,
which as ratified treaty or customary international law comprise part of the
law of the United States.
At this writing, the Trump Administration has been in office for a little
over nine months, a tumultuous period that has disrupted the world of interna-
tional law. A looming question is whether the Trump Administration's many
initiatives will permanently change the nature of America's relationship with
international law and its institutions. Is there a counter-strategy to increase
the odds that those international obligations will be faithfully executed?
This Lecture will argue first that there is such a counter-strategy-the
same theory that I have been applying for most of my professional career,
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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both as a scholar and as a practitioner: Transnational Legal Process.2 Sec-
ond, that during the first half-year of the Trump Administration, we have been
watching this counter-strategy play out, by transnational actors both inside
and outside the U.S. government, to mitigate the Trump Administration's ef-
forts to break, stretch, or violate international law. Third, what is ultimately at
stake is a struggle between competing visions of a future world order. In the
short term, this unfolding counter-strategy is an appropriate response to curb
the new Administration's excesses and to preserve America's constitutional
obligations to comply with binding international standards. But more funda-
mentally, this approach serves as an important counter-measure to prevent the
slow backsliding of our Kantian postwar systent into a more cynical, Orwelli-
an system of global governance far less respectful of democracy, human
rights, and the rule of international law.
I. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS As ROPE-A-DOPE
The United States of America-and its President in particular-are pow-
erful players in the making and unmaking of international law. But the basic
idea underlying Transnational Legal Process is that international law is no
longer just for nation-states or national governments. What Jeremy Bentham
once called "inter-national law"-the law between and among sovereign na-
tions-has evolved into a hybrid body of international and domestic law de-
veloped by a large number of public and private transnational actors. These
sovereign and nonsovereign actors include our allies; states, municipalities,
and localities of the United States; government bureaucracies; the media;
courts; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); intergovernmental organiza-
tions (IGOs); and committed individuals. I have argued that these many ac-
tors make and remake transnational law-the hybrid law that combines do-
mestic and international, public and private law-by generating interactions
that lead to interpretations of international law that become internalized into,
and thereby binding under, domestic (in this case, United States) law. These
internalized rules create default patterns of international law-observant behav-
ior for all participants in the process. Those default patterns become rou-
tinized, "sticky," and thus difficult to deviate from without sustained effort.
The central insight of this analysis is that most compliance with law
comes not from coercion, but from patterns of obedience.3 Even all alone at 2
o'clock in the morning, most of us still stop for a red light. Why? Because
2. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND.
L.J. 1397 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824
(1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law? 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181 (1996).
3. To say this, of course, is not to deny that under some circumstances, coercive techniques can and
do play an important role in enforcing legal norms. For examples, see generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE
FORCE OF LAW (2015).
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most legal compliance does not owe to the fact that a police car is sitting be-
hind you. The prime reason why law-abiding people don't regularly steal
from each other is not because it's illegal, or because they fear detection, but
because they have internalized a norm, probably learned from their parents, in
school or at church, that ethical and law-abiding people do not steal. Internal-
ized norms, not coercion, are the main drivers of legal obedience.4 Most legal
obedience, I would argue, comes from such norm internalization. And norm
internalization can come from many sources, the most prominent being reli-
gion, the paradigmatic internalized norm set. Once norms have been internal-
ized by individuals and institutions, they become habits that, once learned, are
not easily abandoned. Just as boats sail between riverbanks established by
decades of flowing water, and travelers tend to observe established traffic
lanes, human and institutional behavior tends to follow default patterns set by
internalized norms.
But neither are default habits immutable; with concerted effort, they can
be changed. In my own lifetime, many Americans used to smoke regularly
indoors, discard plastics in regular trash bins, and leave their seat belts un-
buckled. But if, at this lecture, you are drinking from a plastic bottle, you
have probably internalized a different habit, which is to throw recyclables into
a recycling bin. Why? Because everywhere you go in this building you en-
counter a sign, read a warning, see a green recycle bin, are confronted by a
friend, or are forced to answer a challenge-all interactions that make clear
that what you used to do out of laziness or indifference no longer represents
appropriate behavior. But most likely, you now recycle because a history of
such interactions has gradually internalized within you a new normative inter-
pretation: a period of socialization over time has now taught you to think it is
right to recycle.5 A series of interactions has clarified a new norm of desira-
ble behavior that you have accepted as part of your internal value set. If most
compliance comes from obedience, and most obedience comes from norm in-
ternalization, then most norm internalization comes from such interactions,
which have led to interpretations that have led to internalizations.
So how does this theory become counter-strategy? If asked, "Do you be-
lieve in the power of transnational legal process?" I would answer-like my
old teacher Abe Chayes' Southern Baptist minister-"Believe in it? I've seen
it done!" Throughout my career, I have seen this strategy applied repeatedly
by players both inside and outside of the government. Indeed, as a human
rights lawyer, I have tried to apply it myself from outside the government; as
a government official, I tried to apply it from within.
Nongovernmental actors can apply the "outside strategy"-"Interaction-
4. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
5. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, supra
note 2.
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Interpretation-Internalization"-to generate interactions that force interpreta-
tions that promote internalizations of international norms even by resisting
governments. Lawsuits are the paradigmatic example: if a government policy
moves in a legally noncompliant direction, an outside nongovernmental group
can sue (generate an interaction) that yields a judicial ruling (an interpreta-
tion) that the government defendant must then obey as a matter of domestic
law (norm internalization).
The inside strategy, which I applied as a government official, I called
"Engage-Translate-Leverage," or simply, using "International Law as Smart
Power." In hindsight, call this "the Obama-Clinton doctrine." President
Barack Obama tried to apply this foreign policy philosophy throughout his
presidency. Upon taking office in 2009, President Obama said that "A new
era of engagement has begun," emphasizing that "living our values doesn't
make us weaker. It makes us safer, and it makes us stronger."6 That ap-
proach was particularly urged upon him by his first Secretary of State, Hillary
Rodham Clinton, who argued: "We must use what has been called smart pow-
er, the full range of tools at our disposal-diplomatic, economic, military, po-
litical, legal, and cultural" to achieve better policy outcomes.7 Had she been
elected President, Secretary Clinton undoubtedly would have continued that
approach.
This strategy means, first, that given the choice, the United States-and
other like-minded states-should choose engagement over unilateralism.
When faced with a foreign policy problem, the United States should not pro-
ceed alone but rather seek to engage with other countries and adversaries
around common values, in search of diplomatic solutions that can be embed-
ded within durable international law principles.
Second, a strategy of "international law as smart power" suggests that
wherever possible, the United States should choose a persuasive legal transla-
tion over denying the applicability of law altogether. If a country faces an en-
tirely new situation-for example, problems that simply did not exist when
the international laws of war were first drafted, such as drone warfare or cyber
conflict-a tempting, but wrong, approach would be simply to deny the ap-
plicability of law, i.e., to ask the "Tina Turner question": "What's law got to
do with it? What's law but a sweet old-fashioned notion?" Since we face a
new technological situation, some might reason, we must be in a "law-free
zone" where we can do whatever we want. Under this reasoning, there is no
6. President Obama's Address to Congress, N.Y. TIMEs (Feb. 24, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/us/polifics/24obama-text.html [http://perma.cc/WT94-Q2RT].
7. Senate Confirmation Hearing: Hillary Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/13/us/politics/13text-clinton.html [http//perma.cc/MY73-WFLX]. See,
e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec'y of State, Remarks at the John Jay School of Criminal Justice: Smart
Power Approach to Counterterrorism (Sept. 9, 2011), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/09/172034.htm [http://perma.cc/MC2X-T5ZQ]. See gen-
erally HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, HARD CHOICES (2014).
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law to apply because we are in a "legal black hole."
But the better, smart-power alternative is for a government to apply what
Montesquieu called the "spirit of the laws," or a "translation approach."8
True, we may not have a set of established legal rules that map perfectly onto
the new and unanticipated factual circumstance, but we can still make a good-
faith effort to translate from the spirit of existing rules of law to new situa-
tions.9 As a policy matter, the translation approach is superior because law-
abiding nations strive to act not based on power or expedience alone, but ra-
ther, to cabin their new activity within existing, recognizable legal frame-
works.
There is a world of difference between saying that we are facing a new
situation where there is no law to apply and saying that the existing rules do
not exactly cover this new situation, but we are trying in good faith to trans-
late the spirit and intent of existing laws to govern it. In the former circum-
stance, we are saying that we can make up our own rules and no third party
can judge us. But in the latter circumstance, we acknowledge the need to join
with others committed to the rule of law to frame a new set of rules that can
eventually enjoy international consensus and, ultimately, legal legitimacy. If
a more "law-friendly" path exists, "we should follow it, because doing so will
keep the law on our side, keep us on the moral high ground, and preserve the
vital support of our allies and international institutions as the crisis pro-
ceeds."10
The third element of the inside strategy is a commitment to leveraging
international law as smart power. This means blending legal arguments with
other tools-including military force, diplomacy, development, technology,
markets, and international institutions-to achieve complex sustainable for-
eign policy outcomes that cannot be achieved without the legitimacy that in-
ternational law bestows: think the Dayton Peace Accord, the New START
treaty, or the Paris Climate Change Agreement. Take, for example, the clas-
sic study called The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers by my Yale colleague,
historian Paul Kennedy." History teaches, Kennedy argued, that any great
power that tries repeatedly to dominate the world with hard military or eco-
nomic force will eventually find that force "tapped out," or exhausted. Great
8. BARON DE MONTESQUlEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans., 1st ed., 1900). See
also Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARv. INT'L L.J. 23 (2002).
9. Cf Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) (arguing that any com-
plete account of interpretation must "translate," by allowing for changes in readings even when there has
been no change in the document's text).
10. Harold Hongju Koh, Preserving American Values: The Challenge at Home and Abroad, in THE
AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 143, 153 (Strobe Talbott and Nayan
Chanda eds., 2001) ("[W]hich of the available courses of action most closely comports with both the spirit
and the letter of the law? If there is such a 'law-friendly' course, we should follow it, because doing so will
keep the law on our side, keep us on the moral high ground, and preserve the vital support of our allies and
international institutions as the crisis proceeds.").
11. PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS (1989).
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powers tend to overexert their hard power and fall into a situation of "imperial
overstretch," plagued by external debt, national exhaustion, and internal dis-
sension. They try to do too much with too little, seeking to motivate the ac-
tions of others with tools of coercion rather than persuasion, when in fact
most international cooperation comes not from coercion but from joint action
motivated by shared values. As we have seen in recent years, even a global
superpower like the United States possesses only a limited amount of hard
power that can be overtaxed-for example, by simultaneous military cam-
paigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria.
The more successful and urable approach, political scientist Joseph Nye
has argued, is for wise nations to seek to influence the world through "smart
power"1 2-a combination of "hard" and "soft" power that gains legitimacy
from espousing international law and common values. If a nation squanders
its reputation for legitimacy, it devalues its greatest asset in exercising global
leadership. That is why we seek to make and keep, not gratuitously break, in-
ternational rules: because those rules hold together the fabric of our multilat-
eral relationships with our allies, international organizations, and other stand-
ing institutions of international law.
A moment's reflection tells us that the two strategies are complementary.
An outsider's strategy of using "interaction-interpretation-norm internaliza-
tion" to promote international legal compliance within resisting governments
can be combined with an insider's strategy of "engage-translate-leverage" to
embed and preserve respect for international law within U.S. governmental
bureaucracies. Interaction promotes engagement; interpretation generates
translations; and norm internalization ensures and enables lawful options to be
leveraged with other policy tools into broader, more creative, and more dura-
ble policies. Thus, these two strategies working together-the former imple-
mented by committed nongovernmental activists, the latter by governmental
officials committed to the rule of law 13-can lead us into a pattern of default
compliance with international law that makes casual deviation from these
rules more difficult than neophytes might believe.
So how does this analysis apply to a new, willful president arriving at the
White House with a self-proclaimed radical agenda to change how America
engages the world? In its first year, the Trump Administration has taken a
foreign policy approach strikingly hostile to that taken by not only such Dem-
ocratic Presidents as Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, and Democratic Presi-
12. E.g., Joseph S. Nye, Public Diplomacy and Soft Power, 616 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL.
AND Soc. SC. 94, 107-08 (2008) ("Power in a global information age, more than ever, will include a soft
dimension of attraction as well as the hard dimensions of coercion and inducement. The ability to combine
hard and soft power effectively is 'smart power."').
13. I have labeled such outsiders "transnational norm entrepreneurs" and such insiders "governmental
norm sponsors," respectively. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International
Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 647-48 (1998).
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dential candidates (and Secretaries of State) Hillary Clinton and John Kerry,
but also by such past internationalist Republican Presidents as George H. W.
Bush and Richard Nixon.14
The emerging Trump philosophy seems to be a general rejection of the
Obama approach: not "engage-translate-leverage," but rather, "disengage-
black hole-hard power." Wherever possible, the Trump instinct seems to be
to disengage-unilateralism, or, as he calls it, "America First."' 5 The Trump
approach does not value concerted efforts to translate existing legal rules but
rather claims that there are no rules that bind our conduct. Under this
worldview, the United States should act based on its perceived national inter-
ests, not international rules. The Trump approach seems grounded on claimed
national rights, not the universal rights on which this country was founded
and that form much of the foundation of modem international law. Finally,
the emerging Trump approach seems to rest almost entirely on hard power,
offering no visible strategy for bilateral and multilateral diplomatic engage-
ment or any attendant role for the State Department.16 Trump and his team
have shown little or no inclination to apply an approach that would allow
America to leverage the legitimacy of lawful options into a more creative set
of proactive solutions to pressing international problems.
As the new Administration takes hold, the obvious question is: who will
change whom? Will Trump change international law, or vice versa? The
basic message from the theory described above is that no single player in the
transnational legal process-not even the most powerful one-can easily dis-
card the rules that we have been following for some time. If players outside
and inside the government enforce existing legal constraints in a way that
makes policy changes and institutional exits too difficult or politically costly,
a mercurial president like Donald Trump may decide to just "move on"-to
claim that he has "checked the box" on a political promise and now needs to
focus on other issues that he and his political base care more about, such as
tax or infrastructure reform.
If all of this seems too academic, just recall "Rope-a-Dope," the famous
counter-strategy developed by our greatest pugilistic strategist, Muhammad
Ali. Faced in Zaire by George Foreman-a much younger, stronger, seem-
ingly invincible champion-Ali settled upon a brilliantly simple counter-
strategy. He surprised everyone by retreating to the ropes and letting the
champion pound him, taking pains only to avoid getting knocked out himself.
14. After September 11, George W. Bush, like Donald Trump, headed sharply toward a strategy of
"disengage-black hole-hard power," but he visibly reverted toward the use of smart power by the time he left
office.
15. President Donald J. Trump, The Inaugural Address, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address [http://perma.cc/GLT5-766E].
16. See generally Robbie Gramer, Dan De Luce & Colum Lynch, How the Trump Administration
Broke the State Department, FOREIGN POL'Y (July 31, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/3 1/how-the-
trump-administration-broke-the-state-department/ [h tp://perma.cc/6PYG-PM65].
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For many rounds, Ali let his opponent "punch himself out," until, in the late
rounds, Ali finally came off the ropes and knocked out his now exhausted and
weakened opponent.
The analogy here should be clear. If the Trump Administration threatens
to violate international law, actors outside the federal government can apply
the external strategy of "interaction-interpretation-intemalization" to hold it
accountable.17 Those opposing President Trump's policy initiatives on legal
grounds can use the various fora available to them to resist those initiatives,
forcing Trump to punch himself out by expending energy and capital on initi-
atives that do not advance his or his party's chances at reelection. Meanwhile,
U.S. bureaucrats committed to international rules can continue to pursue a
strategy of engage-translate-leverage to maintain default compliance with ex-
isting norms, unless explicitly directed to do otherwise.18 Outside activists
can work with other players who are checking the White House to generate
interactions via direct democracy, citizen mobilization, litigation, advocacy,
and resistance. If the federal government fails to follow international law,
states and localities-as both outsiders and insiders-can step up to help fill
the gap.19
This struggle can continue until one side or another gets exhausted. But
those in today's "Resistance" are making much the same strategic bet as Ali
made in Zaire: that over time, the blustering player who loudly launches mul-
tiple ineffectual initiatives to change the status quo will force little real
change; get tired, exhausted, and frustrated from all the flailing around; and
ultimately find himself getting politically "knocked out."
17. See Clare Francis Moran, Crystallizing the International Rule of International Law: Trump's Acci-
dental Contribution to International Law, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 491 (2017).
18. For a recent example, see the Pentagon's response to President Trump's tweet announcing a
"Transgender Ban" in the U.S. military. Indrees Ali & Phil Stewart, Top US. General Says No Changes Yet
to Transgender Policy, REUTERS (July 27, 2017, 2:45 PM) ("'There will be no modifications to the current
policy until the President's direction has been received by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary has
issued implementation guidance,' [Joint Chiefs Chair] Dunford said in the written message to service chiefs,
commanders and senior enlisted leaders . . . ."), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-military-transgender-
idUSLINIKIl3U [http://perma.cc/B24H-EEAV]. At this writing, the Transgender Ban in the military re-
mains "under review." Bill Chappell, Mattis Puts Hold on Transgender Ban for Current Military Service
Members, NPR (Aug. 30, 2017, 9:33 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017 /08/30/547258742/mattis-puts-hold-on-transgender-ban-for-current-military-service-members
[http://perma.cc/4S78-9E8X]. Meanwhile, several lawsuits have already been brought to challenge the legali-
ty of the Ban. See, e.g., Kamoski v. Trump, No. 2:17-cv-01297 (W.D. Wash. filed Aug. 28, 2017); Stone v.
Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02459-MJG (D. Md. filed Aug. 28, 2017).
19. For analysis of the possible federalism challenges to state and local efforts at climate diplomacy,
see David Sloss, California's Climate Diplomacy and Dormant Preemption, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 507 (2017).
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II. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS IN ACTION: THE COUNTER-STRATEGY
ILLUSTRATED
This rope-a-dope approach describes the broader counter-strategy of
"transnational legal process" that we have seen play out across the broad
spectrum of U.S. foreign policy during the first year of Donald Trump's pres-
idency. At the risk of trying to describe a landscape from a moving train, let
me illustrate by discussing many interactions witnessed over a broad range of
issue areas.
Donald Trump was inaugurated as President on January 20, 2017. The
next day, millions marched in protest in cities around the world, all chanting
"this is what democracy looks like." Then came the executive orders, starting
with the Travel Ban.
A. Immigration and Refugees
Perhaps the most visible face of the Trump Administration's internation-
al policies has been its harsh stance on immigration, including three travel
bans; an order seeking to strip all federal funding from so-called sanctuary cit-
ies20 ; strict border controls, as illustrated by repeated calls for a wall allegedly
to be paid for by the Mexican government21 ; stated hostility toward refugees
and the courts; an aggressively maximalist penchant for deportation, even of
"Dreamers"2 2; "shock and awe" raids in schools and in homes to encourage
20. On January 25th, President Trump signed an executive order that sought to withdraw all federal
funding from jurisdictions his administration deemed to be "sanctuaries," a term nowhere defined in the order
and apparently used to coerce localities into adopting the aggressive federal immigration agenda. The Coun-
ty of Santa Clara and the City and County of San Francisco sued to challenge the constitutionality of the or-
der and to block its implementation. The jurisdictions argued that the President was attempting to usurp a
spending power he does not possess under the Constitution and that the order violated the Due Process and
Tenth Amendment rights of the localities. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California
agreed, temporarily enjoining nationwide the order's key defunding provision. See Cty. of Santa Clara v.
Trump, No. 17-CV-00485-WHO, 2017 WL 1459081 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017), reconsideration denied, No.
17-CV-00485-WHO, 2017 WL 3086064 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2017). See generally Russell Spivak, Case
Summary: Federal District Court Issues Nationwide Injunction Against Trump's Sanctuary City Executive
Order, LAWFARE (Apr. 26, 2017, 11:45 AM) https://www.lawfareblog.com/case-summary-federal-district-
court-issues-nationwide-injunction-against-trumps-sanctuary-city [http://perma.cc/QZ7P-D99H].
21. But see the remarkable anti-Wall Super Bowl commercial by 84 Lumber. 84 Lumber, 84 Lumber
Super Bowl Commercial- The Entire Journey, YouTUBE (Feb. 5, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-nPo2B-vjZ28 [http//perma.cc/5EPY-7UZRI
22. Section 5 of the Executive Order on Sanctuary Jurisdictions sets out the Administration's expansive
deportation priorities, which include giving immigration officers broad authority to deport any non-citizen
suspected, in that officer's opinion, of posing a "safety risk." On September 5, 2017, President Trump further
announced that he would repeal President Obama's Deferred Action on Childhood Arrivals (DACA) pro-
gram, which grants work permits to about 800,000 undocumented immigrants brought to the United States as
children, but that he would delay its end for six months to give Congress time to pass legislation to replace it.
See Jennifer Rubin, Ending DACA Would Be Trump's Most Evil Act, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-tum/wp/
2017/09/04/trump-ending-daca-would-be-cruelty-
wrapped-in-a-web-of-lies/ [http://perma.cc/YMV9-UKP9]. Yale Law School's Worker and Immigrant
Rights Advocacy Clinic and a number of states swiftly filed suit seeking to enjoin the President's executive
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"self-deportation"; announced plans to cut legal immigration in half23; and,
most glaringly, a willingness to bomb out of professed sympathy for the very
same Syrian children that the Administration refuses to admit into the United
States.
On January 27, 2017, President Trump signed his most visible executive
order: the Travel Ban that for ninety days blocked entry into the United States
by citizens of seven predominantly Muslim countries (in March reduced to
six, and in September adjusted to six majority-Muslim countries, plus North
Korea and Venezuela) and barred individuals with valid visas and green cards
from those countries from re-entering the United States.24 For 120 days, the
Ban suspended entry of all refugees into the United States, and for an indefi-
nite period of time it barred all Syrian refugees. This Travel Ban thus seemed
like a thinly disguised Muslim Ban, not least because the President had re-
peatedly promised to impose such a measure on the campaign trail.25
On its face, such a policy seemed blatantly illegal. First, ours is a coun-
try founded on religious freedom. Even a sanitized Muslim Ban discriminates
against one religion, de facto preferencing others, in violation of domestic
law. Such a broad ban has never been authorized by statute; to the contrary,
immigration laws forbid exclusion based on national origin. Second, under
international law, such a ban facially violates two treaties to which the U.S.
has long been a party: the Refugee Convention,26 which requires that "[t]he
Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees
without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin," as well as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that "[a]ll
persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law." 27 Third, the Ban was both over- and under-
inclusive. While none of the countries from which people were excluded had
actually ever produced a terrorist who had killed anyone on U.S. soil, other
action. WIRAC Challenges Trump Administration's Termination of DACA, YALE L. SCH. (Sept. 5, 2017),
httpsJ/law.yale.edu/yls-today/news/wirac-challenges-trump-administrations-termination-daca
[http://perma.cc/8QZ6-FQPN].
23. See Reforming American Immigration for Strong Employment Act, S. 354, 115th Cong. (2017).
24. Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan.
27, 2017).
25. E.g., Sonam Sheth, Trump Campaign Deletes Statement on Muslim Ban After Reporter Asks About
It, Bus. INSIDER (May 8, 2017, 3:27 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-campaign-muslim-ban-
statement-website-2017-5 [http://perma.cc/Q9FM-AXF8].
26. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 3, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. See also
comments by Trump adviser Rudy Giuliani describing how he was asked to implement a Muslim Ban. Amy
B. Wang, Trump Asked for a 'Muslim Ban,' Giuliani Says - and Ordered a Commission to Do It 'Legally",
WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-
a-muslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-commission-to-do-it-legally [http://perma.cc/7HJB-JJQ6]; Scott
Horsley, Trump's Latest Tweets on Travel Ban Could Raise New Legal Hurdles, NPR (June 5, 2017, 9:40
AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/06/05/ 531558813/trumps-latest-tweets-on-travel-ban-could-raise-new-legal-
hurdles [http://perma.cc/5VX4-SCGH].
27. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 26, Dec. 9, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (rati-
fled June 8, 1992).
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countries (e.g., Saudi Arabia, from which most of the 9/11 attackers hailed)
were not on the list.28
Fourth, the President had repeatedly called for a system of "extreme vet-
ting." But he seemed not to appreciate that we already have a system of ex-
treme vetting, conducted on an intensive, individualized basis. Far from be-
ing ineffective, that system has been working, as demonstrated by the fact that
no individual vetted through the rigorous system regulating the entry of refu-
gees has committed a fatal terrorist act in our country for more than forty
years.29 The new Administration proposed instead to replace individualized
vetting with categorical exclusions based on national and religious stereo-
types. But under our Constitution, group-based exclusions are illegal when
based on such crude categorizations. Such stereotyping offends a basic
American article of faith: that we judge people not by where they are from, or
by the color of their skin, or by the deity they worship, but by the content of
their individual character. As I learned from many sad hours of studying ter-
rorist profiles, some proven terrorists fit no group stereotype, while other in-
dividuals who may fit a stereotype could instead prove to be gold-star fathers
of American soldiers. Fifth, the Travel Ban emerged from a grossly defective
governmental process. As it was rushed into operation, the executive order
was not vetted by knowledgeable governmental lawyers, the incoming Secre-
taries in the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, or most of the
key legislators who oversee counterintelligence and homeland security is-
sues.30
Sixth, and most glaringly, the sudden, overbroad Travel Ban responded
to no new national security threat, a fact that I confirmed with a number of
former government colleagues who had served in the most sensitive national
security positions until Inauguration Day, January 20, 2017. They all agreed
that they knew of no new security threat-and the new Administration had
identified none-that warranted sharply shifting toward an overtly discrimina-
tory policy only seven days later. I found a large number of former national
security officials of both political parties ready to attest that the Travel Ban
bore no rational relation to any compelling governmental interest.
28. Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8977;
Brief for Former National Security Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellees, Int'l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Donald J. Trump, 857 F. 3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-15589), 2017 WL 1372588.
29. Alex Nowrasteh, Little National Security Benefit to Trump's Executive Order on Immigration,
CATO INST. (Jan. 25, 2017, 3:31 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/little-national-security-benefit-trumps-
executive-order-immigration [http://perma.cc/59ZJ-MJPC].
30. Justin Sink & Ben Brody, U.S. Exempts Green Card Holders from Trump's Travel Ban,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2017, 5:53 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-29/trump-says-u-
s-needs-extreme-vetting-after-action-by-judges [http://perma.cc/ZH3L-ZB67]; Sean Sullivan & Kelsey Snell,
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As transnational legal process kicked in, the Ban came under swift and
furious legal challenge. An Iraqi interpreter, Hameed Khalid Darweesh, who
had worked with and supported U.S. forces in Iraq, was one of the first people
stopped pursuant to the Ban, at John F. Kennedy Airport. His counsel, the
Yale Law School Worker and Immigrant Rights Advocacy Clinic supervised
by my colleague Professor Michael Wishnie, provoked an interaction that led
to a legal interpretation: they successfully filed for a temporary restraining or-
der on Darweesh's behalf in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
New York.3 1 Darweesh's counsel then asked the new Rule of Law Clinic that
I had just organized at Yale32 to develop a declaration on behalf of former na-
tional security officials confirming that the Travel Ban would likely harm our
counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts, because it was based not on
any known national security threat but rather, on illegal stereotypes and prej-
udice.
As the actions broadened to include a suit brought by the State of Wash-
ington in Washington federal court, our Yale Law School Rule of Law Clinic
filed first a joint declaration and then an amicus brief on behalf of ten former
national security officials: former Secretaries of State Madeleine Albright and
John Kerry, former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, former Secretary of
Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, four former heads of the CIA (including
two Republicans, Michael Hayden and John McLaughlin), and the most re-
cent National Security Advisor and her two deputies (Susan Rice, Avril
Haines, and Lisa Monaco). A number of these amici were still serving in the
government just seven days before this order was issued and swore that they
saw no emergent national security threat that justified the sudden policy
change.
This outside pressure soon combined with internal resistance. In the
State Department, a thousand career officials swiftly signed a dissent channel
cable that said: "this ban stands in opposition to the core American and consti-
tutional values that we, as federal employees, took an oath to uphold."33 The
cable closed, memorably, by declaring "we are better than this ban."34 Re-
markably, it then became evident that the White House had announced the
31. Darweesh v. Trump, No. 17 CIV. 480 (AMD), 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017).
32. 1 am particularly grateful to my former State Department colleague Phil Spector for his co-
leadership of the national security group of our Clinic, to my colleague Hope Metcalf and Darweesh counsel
Mike Wishnie, and to our Clinic's founding student directors Denisha Bacchus, Sameer Jaywant, Mitzi Stei-
ner, and Eugene Rusyn. For a description of the Clinic's work in the Travel Ban litigation, see generally Rule
of Law Clinic Files Amicus Brief in SCOTUS Travel Ban Case, YALE L. SCH. (Sept. 20, 2017),
https://law.yale.edulyls-today/news/rule-law-clinic-files-amicus-brief-scotus-travel-ban-case
[http://perma.cc/P3DY-EYHR].
33. Dissent Channel Memorandum to Edward J. Lacey, Acting Director of Pol'y Planning, Alternatives






Ban without actually knowing whether the Justice Department was prepared
to defend it in court. When ordered to do so, Acting Attorney General Sally
Yates refused, for which she was fired and accused by the President of having
"betrayed the Department of Justice."35 In short order, more than thirty cases
were filed in the First, Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits. As the legal bat-
tles progressed, the intelligence community and other parts of the bureaucracy
apparently engaged in unprecedented leaking, providing more grist for the
lawsuits.36 As the cases unfolded, the Executive Order was repeatedly
blocked, at which point the Administration retracted the first travel ban and
announced its intent to review and re-release it later.
In the meantime, other players in the transnational legal process joined
the fray. Our allies, including Germany's Angela Merkel, Canada's Justin
Trudeau,3 7 Britain's Theresa May, France's Emmanuel Macron, Australia's
Malcolm Turnbull, and many other members of the G-20, all raised the issue
directly in early conversations with the new President. Pressed by such
groups as Veterans for American Ideals,3 8 members of the U.S. military pro-
tested, particularly when it became clear that our Iraqi military allies were be-
ing barred from entry. One of the commanding generals of the Iraqi forces,
Talib al Kenani, marveled, "I'm a four star general, and I'm banned from en-
tering the U.S.?" 39
Domestic actors quickly came forward. Democratic members of Con-
gress-joined by such Republican legislators as Senators John McCain, Lind-
sey Graham, Bob Corker, Marco Rubio, and Tim Scott, as well as House
Homeland Security Chairman Mike McCaul and Representative Charlie
Dent-all criticized the Order. Unexpected Republican voices like the Koch
brothers, former Vice President Dick Cheney, and conservative former Justice
Department lawyer John Yoo all opposed the Ban, suggesting that the deci-
sion had driven a wedge between Trump and his traditional conservative al-
35. Sari Horwitz, Who Is Sally Yates? Meet the Acting Attorney General Thump Fired for 'Betraying'




36. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Dep't of Homeland Security, Citizenship Likely an Unreliable
Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States (Feb. 2017),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3474730-DHS-intelligence-document-on-President-Donald.html
[http://perma.cc/DH7E-BJEA].
37. Indeed, the Canadians offered temporary residence to anyone stranded in Canada by the Order.
Ashifa Kassam, Canada To Offer Temporary Residence to Those Stranded by Trump Travel Ban, GuARDIAN
(Jan. 31, 2017, 10:59 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/31/canada-trump-travel-ban-
temporary-residence [http://perma.cc/98YU-FHJD].
38. Vets4AmericanIdeals (@Vets4Amerldeals), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/Vets4AmerIdeals
[http://perma.cc/CP6A-Y8MQ].
39. Charlie D'Agata, Iraqi General Who Works with American Military Kept from Visiting U.S., CBS
NEWS (Jan. 30, 2017, 7:30 PM), www.cbsnews.com/news/iraqi-general-who-works-with-american-military-
kept-from-visiting-u-s/ [http//perma.cc/A69A-GHRP].
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lies.40 Fifteen State Attorney Generals protested not just the Travel Ban but
also Trump's plan to build a wall, to renew deportations, and to punish sanc-
tuary cities.41 Dozens of cities and counties filed an amicus brief supporting
the individual and subnational plaintiffs. 42 Forty-seven universities, including
my home university, Yale, spoke out against the Ban,43 and 163 tech compa-
nies filed an amicus brief protesting how the Travel Ban would affect their
workers.44
Within hours, the resistance had spread beyond the courts to the streets.
Armed by the internet, lawyers sprang into action. Because the initial lawsuit
filed by Yale's WIRAC Clinic took the form of a habeas class action, certifi-
cation of the class allowed every immigrant blocked at the airport to say they
were entitled to their own lawyer. More than 4000 volunteer lawyers across
America rushed to their nearest international airport, showing officials court
orders that they had downloaded to their cellphones and iPads and filing ha-
beas petitions based on legal templates that our students had uploaded.45 As
taxi, Uber, and Lyft drivers continued to deliver more lawyers, the airports
became centers of protest, with spontaneous demonstrations erupting in doz-
ens of airports only one week after widespread demonstrations had transpired
in city streets. Acts of solidarity broke out all across America, including indi-
vidual protests, group marches, and community candlelight vigils. Popular
culture joined in: the Museum of Modern Art and its exhibits displayed art by
individuals from the excluded countries; Saturday Night Live and late-night
comedians attacked the Ban; traditional and social media highlighted the hu-
man impact of the Ban in separating families; and stories were virally shared
on Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, and other social media outlets. Even Super
Bowl commercials told sympathetic stories about immigrants who came to
America to make good, like the founders of the Anheuser-Busch beer dis-
40. Philip Elliott, The Koch Brothers Oppose President Trump's Immigration Ban, TIME (Jan. 29,
2017), http://time.com/4652905/koch-brothers-donald-trump-immigration-Ban-order [http://perma.cc/2FQR-
B6H2]; Heather Digby Parton, George W. Bush's "Torture Lawyer" Turns on Trump-But It May Be Too
Late, SALON (Feb. 7, 2017, 5:15 AM),
http://www.salon.com/2017/02/07/george-w-bushs-torture-lawyer-turns-on-trump-but-it-may-be-too-late
[http://perma.cc/AC7W-LFA6]; Justin Wm. Moyer, Dick Cheney Slams Trump's Muslim Entry Ban, WASH.
POST (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/moming-mix/wp/2015/12/08/dick-cheney-
slams-trumps-muslim-entry-ban-and-suggests-u-s-re-invade-middle-east [http://perma.cc/A2NK-KFKU].
41. Dan Levine, Attorneys General from 15 U.S. States, DC Decry Immigration Order, REUTERs (Jan.
29, 2017, 12:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-attomeygenerals/attomeys-general-from-
15-u-s-states-dc-decry-immigration-order-idUSKBN5DOXZ [http://perma.cc/PV9G-XN4C].
42. Brief for Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, and Other Major Cities and Counties as
Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, Hawai'i v. Trump, No. CV 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 2017 WL 1167383 (D.
Haw. Mar. 29, 2017).
43. Katie Reilly, University Leaders Call President Trump's Immigration Order a Threat to American
Higher Ed, TIME (Feb. 3, 2017), http://time.com/4660098/donald-trump-universities-immigration-ban
[http://perma.cc/Z33J-3P24].
44. Brief for Technology Companies as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Hawai'i v. Trump, No.
CV 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 2017 WL 1167383 (D. Haw. Mar. 29, 2017).





tributorship.46 Interest groups took turns staging major demonstrations, in-
cluding a March for Climate, a March by Scientists, a Day Without Immi-
grants (when New York diners couldn't get a meal in less than three hours),
and a Day Without Women (when little got done anywhere).
By March, the President had issued a second, revised Travel Ban,4 7
which maintained the original Ban's basic features. Our Rule of Law Clinic
converted our initial national security declaration into an amicus brief signed
by fifty former officials that would eventually be filed at the Supreme
Court.4 8 The argument was simple: "It doesn't matter how much lipstick you
put on that pig; it's still a pig." A Muslim Ban, however packaged, is still a
Muslim Ban. We argued that the revised order was "ill[]conceived, poorly
implemented and ill[]explained."4 9 We again pointed out that there was no
national security justification for this sudden change of policy, which attacked
humanitarian values while threatening U.S. jobs.50 The revised Ban would
endanger our troops in the field, counterterrorism partnerships, and domestic
law enforcement and enrage the very Muslim-American communities whose
help the U.S. government needs in order to find those individuals who might
commit terrorist attacks within the United States. Even if one's goal is ex-
treme vetting, the existing individualized vetting system was plainly superior
to a group Ban.
Even before the revised Ban went into effect, it was blocked by district
courts in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.5 1 In the first skirmish before the Su-
preme Court over a stay of the Ninth Circuit's injunction, Chief Justice Rob-
erts and Justice Kennedy joined the liberal justices-Breyer, Ginsburg, So-
tomayor, and Kagan-in a Solomonic per curiam opinion from which Justices
46. Budweiser Focuses on Immigration in Super Bowl Commercial, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 31, 2017, 6:22
PM), www.chicagotribune.com/sports/football/ct-nfl-super-bowl-advertising-anheuser-busch-spt-20170131-
story.html [http://perma.cc/GJR8-VX2X].
47. Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209
(Mar. 6, 2017).
48. See Brief for National Security Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 3-4, Donald J.
Trump v. State of Hawai'i (Nos. 16-1436 & 16-1540) http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/16_1436_16 _1540_bsacFormerNationalSecurityOfficials.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2HYA-GFLP] (arguing that "all available evidence suggests that the Order was not based on
national security judgment at all, but rather, on a deliberate political decision to discriminate against a reli-
gious minority").
49. Brief for Former National Security Officials, supra note 28.
50. USA Today reports a potential loss of $18 billion in tourism revenue this year. Bart Jansen,
Trump's Travel Ban Could Cost $18B in US. Tourism, Analysis Shows, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2017, 6:01
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/03/29/trumps-travel-ban-could-cost-18b-us-tourism-
travel-analysts-say/99708758/ [http://perma.cc/6DHQ-J2R9].
51. Hawai'i v. Trump, No. CV 17-00050 DKW-KSC, 2017 WL 1167383 (D. Haw. Mar. 29, 2017),
hearing in banc denied sub nom. Hawai'i v. Trump, No. 17-15589, 2017 WL 1420813 (9th Cir. Apr. 21,
2017), aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Hawai'i v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017),
cert. granted sub nom. Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Int'l Refugee As-
sistance Project v. Trump, No. CV TDC-17-0361, 2017 WL 1018235 (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2017), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (May 31, 2017), as amended (June 15, 2017), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017); Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash.
Feb. 3, 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom. Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2017).
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Thomas and Alito, and new Justice Neil Gorsuch, vociferously dissented.52
Initially, the merits of the case were scheduled to be argued before the Su-
preme Court in October 2017. But just weeks before that argument, the Ad-
ministration issued yet a third version of its Ban, dropping one country (Su-
dan) from the list while adding several others (Chad, North Korea, and with
respect to some officials, Venezuela), which caused the Court to remove the
case from its October argument calendar.53
On its face, Travel Ban 3.0 continued to take the same overbroad, blan-
ket approach that the lower courts had previously enjoined, and appeared
based more on national stereotypes than on intense individualized vetting.
The revision's tweaks seemed designed mainly to lessen the impression that
the Ban was targeting Muslim-majority countries-although Chad is, in fact,
predominantly Muslim; only a tiny number of North Koreans enter the U.S.
every year anyway, most of them refugees; and the targeted Venezuelan offi-
cials were not apparently being sanctioned for terrorist activity. 54 The abrupt
change led to the Court declaring both circuit court judgments moot and va-
cated-although if so treated, the Ban could be constantly revised to block fu-
ture travel while persistently avoiding judicial review.55 Within days, district
courts in both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits again enjoined Travel Ban 3.0,
raising three obvious questions, to all of which the answer should be no: first,
whether the Supreme Court will declare the new cases moot; second, whether
a finding of mootness would vacate the decisions below that blocked imple-
mentation of Travel Ban 3.0; and third, if the case reaches the merits, whether
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court's tradi-
tional swing man, will vote to sustain the essence of the Ban.
Beneath it all, the real question remains: how much does Donald Trump
really care about the Muslim Ban? After all, it has already been shown that
the Ban drives a wedge deep within his fragile coalition, between Trumpites
and traditional Republicans. Every piece of capital he spends on this issue
52. Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088 (2017) (narrowing the Travel Ban
by stay to bar only those travelers who lacked a "bona fide relationship" to the United States).
53. Michael D. Schear, Ron Nixon & Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Cancels Hearing on Previous
Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/politics/trump-travel-
ban-supreme-court.html [http://perma.cc/U3VW-P9HD].
54. A Trump Travel Ban We've Seen Before, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/opinion/editorials/trump-travel-Ban.html [http://perma.cc/TC7E-
QCE9].
55. The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabil-
ities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety
Threats, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/09/24/enhancing-vetting-capabilities-and-processes-detecting-attempted-entry
[http://perma.cclXLE5-CNEW]; Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, Trump's Travel Ban to Be Replaced by
Restrictions Tailored to Certain Countries, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017),
httpsJ/www.nytimes.com/2017/09/22/us/politics/ trump-travel-Ban-replacement-restrictions.html
[http://perma.cc/PZZ2-5DKV]. For analysis see Marty Lederman, The New Entry Suspensions and Re-




takes away from the core agenda that actually interests his coalition: the
Obamacare repeal, jobs, tax reform, regulatory rollback, and infrastructure.
To date, the coalition's repeated efforts to repeal Obamacare have spectacu-
larly failed, further disrupting the President's coalition and leaving precious
little capital for his remaining core issues.
B. Human Rights
During my adult life, as a law professor, as Legal Adviser, and as Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, I have
heard every Secretary of State-whether Democratic or Republican-speak
out in support of human rights.56 But when asked about human rights in other
countries, our newest Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, repeatedly said at his
confirmation hearing that he was "not ready to judge."57 But how can any
responsible U.S. official not be ready to judge, for example, whether innocent
people in the Philippines can be summarily executed by their authoritarian
President, Rodrigo Duterte?5 8 Secretary Tillerson also announced his inten-
tion to support American interests, but not American values.59 He stated, re-
markably, that an overreliance on values "creates obstacles to our ability to
advance our national security interests [and] our economic interests."6 0 By so
saying, he reaffirmed Trump's prioritizing of national over universal rights
and overlooked decades of bipartisan U.S. policy, which had repeatedly con-
firmed that advancing global human rights values is in fact a core American
interest. 61
Since then, Tillerson has declined to engage with respect to human rights
and has not spoken out in support of universal human rights values in diplo-
macy with China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. U.N. Ambassador Nikki
56. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46
ST. Louis U. L.J. 293 (2002).
57. Zod Chapman, The Early Edition: January 13, 2017, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 13, 2017, 7:55 AM),
https//www.justsecurity.org/36292/early-edition-january-13-2017 [http://perma.cc/M3WB-EHED]; see also
Margaret McGuinness, Paying Lip Service to Human Rights: The Value of Presidential Human Rights Talk,
56 WASHBURN L.J. 471 (2017).
58. Carol Morello, Did Tillerson and Duterte Discuss Human Rights? Depends on Which Side You
Ask., WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/did-tillerson-and-duterte-discuss-
human-rights-depends-on-which-side-you-ask/2017/08/08/6eacl 3 f-1046-4bfl -b971 -
7a4c8a9le8dl-storyhtml [http://perma.cclU6RA-X522].
59. Sec'y of State Rex Tillerson, Remarks to U.S. Department of State Employees (May 3, 2017),
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/05/270620.htm [http://perma.cc/7N5X-8YDL] (stating that
"we really have to understand, in each country or each region of the world that we're dealing with, what are
our national security interests, what are our economic prosperity interests, and then as we can advocate and
advance our values, we should .....
60. Id.
61. For a thoughtful analysis of how Tillerson's approach runs afoul of longstanding Presidential Di-
rective 30, followed by many presidents, see Michael Posner, Tillerson 's Degradation of Human Rights
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Haley called the U.N. Human Rights Council "corrupt."62 The Secretary of
State did not appear at the announcement of the annual Human Rights Re-
port.63 The United States no longer appears to defend its conduct at the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission. And there has been a blatant, disturb-
ing softness on human rights in the Middle East, particularly with respect to
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Turkey, where the President congratulated
President Erdogan after a visibly irregular referendum and an attack by Turk-
ish guards on demonstrators outside the Turkish embassy in Washington.
Most recently, it has been reported that the State Department plans to drop the
promotion of democracy and human rights from its mission statement. 6 The
Administration has plainly lost sight of the many ways in which the United
States has traditionally relied on alliances and cooperation with our rights-
respecting democratic allies to help advance our broader national security in-
terests.65
Perhaps the most visible proposed human rights rollback was candidate
Trump's statement that "[if I am elected, w]e'll use waterboarding and a hell
of a lot worse than waterboarding."66 Shortly after the election, the press
leaked a draft national security executive order that called for reinstating the
discredited program of interrogation of high-value alien terrorists, to be oper-
ated outside the United States, presumably at revived "black sites"-former
offshore detention facilities operated by the C.I.A.67
But campaign statements and draft executive orders are not law. Con-
gress has repeatedly forbidden torture by treaty and statute.68 As a Judge Ad-
62. Somini Sengupta, Nikki Haley Calls United Nations Human Rights Council 'So Corrupt', N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/world/nikki-haley-un-human-rights-council-
corrupt.html [http://permacc/2Q49-UDVS].
63. Michael Gerson, Rex Tillerson Is a Huge Disappointment, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/rex-tillerson-is-a-huge-disappointment/2017/08/07/a9918b8e-
7ba5-1 1e7-9d08-b79fl 91668edstory.html [http://perma.cc/5KAV-BYEL].
64. Josh Rogin, State Department Considers Scrubbing Democracy Promotion from Its Mission,
WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2017/08/01/state-
department-considers-scrubbing-democracy-promotion-from-its-mission [http://perma.cc/EYZ3-C39Z].
65. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, su-
pra note 56; Michael Posner, Trump Abandons the Human Rights Agenda, NEW YORKER (May 26, 2017),
https'//www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trump-abandons-the-human-rights-agenda
[http://perma.cc/72ME-L3K5].
66. Jenna Johnson, Trump Says 'Torture Works,' Backs Waterboarding and 'Much Worse', WASH.
POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https'/www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-says-torture-works-backs-
waterboarding-and-much-worse/2016/02/17/4c9277be-d59c-1 Ie5-bl95-2e29a4el3425_story.html
[http://perma.cc/6D2L-JMRV].
67. Contrary to the President's rhetoric, the draft order cautioned that "[n]o person in the custody of the
United States shall at any time be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, as proscribed by U.S. law." Draft Executive Order on the Detention and Interrogation of Enemy Com-
batants, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/national/read-the-draft-
of-the-executive-order-on-cia-black-sites/2288 [http://perma.cc/YH9N-M29U]; Charlie Savage, Trump
Poised to Lift Ban on C.I.A. 'Black Site' Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2017),
https*//www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/us/politics/cia-detainee-prisons.html [http://perma.cc/MY34-8EUS].
68. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 27, at art. 7 ("No one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."); Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85; War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996) (criminalizing torture); Torture Victim Protection
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vocate General, your Dean, Tom Romig, prominently indicated that he had
taken an oath to obey not any particular President, but rather the Constitution
and laws of the United States of America. Those laws include a treaty of the
United States, the Geneva Conventions,69 and a statute, the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. 70 This is where government lawyers play their most critical
role: maintaining fidelity to the rule of law to promote longer-term societal
stability, even while they accept a new Administration's political direction.
More fundamentally, as Judge Floyd recently noted, "While executive
officers can declare the military reasonableness of conduct amounting to tor-
ture, it is beyond the power of even the President to declare such conduct law-
ful." 7 1 Nor does it matter that Al Qaeda and IS have not signed the Torture
Convention or the Geneva Conventions. The United States is bound to fore-
swear torture not just by reciprocal agreement, but by a treaty-based specifica-
tion of minimal standards of humane treatment that we must unilaterally obey,
whether there is a written agreement or not. 72 Obviously, enforcing a norm
against torture as a universal right serves our national interests, by protecting
our own citizens and soldiers when they are captured. But the norm of hu-
mane treatment to which we have committed ourselves binds us, as a defining
element of our national identity, whether others agree to follow it or not. As
Senator John McCain said in responding to Trump's campaign statements:
"[T]hese statements must not go unanswered because they mislead the Amer-
ican people about the realities of interrogation, how to gather intelligence,
what it takes to defend our security, and, at the most fundamental level, what
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991) (civil remedy); Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988) (civil remedy);
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1045, 129 Stat. 726, 977
(2015). See also Marty Lederman, The President's NDAA Signing Statement Re: GTMO and Anti-Torture
Provisions, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 25, 2015, 9:50), https://www.justsecurity.org/27939/presidents-ndaa-
signing-statement-re-gtmo-anti-torture-provisions [http://perma.cc/Q4XY-VJ55].
69. Common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions, which is considered customary international
law, states as a rule of humanity that there should be no violence to life and persons, including no torture or
outrages on personal dignity, or sentences without due process. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316. Additional Protocol II amplifies these guaran-
tees and outlaws all forms of violence against those persons who are noncombatants. Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-Intemational
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4, ¶ 2, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. The Convention Against Torture
states that "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or threat of war ... may be
invoked as ajustification for torture." The Convention Against Torture Article 2(2), supra note 68.
70. 10 U.S.C. § 855 (1956) ("Punishment by flogging, or by branding, marking, or tattooing on the
body, or any other cruel or unusual punishment, may not be adjudged by any court-martial or inflicted upon
any person subject to this chapter. The use of irons, single or double, except for the purpose of safe custody,
is prohibited.").
71. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 840 F.3d 147, 162 (4th Cir. 2016) (Floyd, J., concurring)
("The fact that the President-let alone a significantly inferior executive officer-opines that certain conduct
is lawful does not determine the actual lawfulness of that conduct. The determination of specific violations
of law is constitutionally committed to the courts, even if that law touches military affairs."); accord Harold
Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1148, 1156 (2006).
72. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Establishing a Constitutional Process, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 51 (2006) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Dean, Yale Law School) ("Some
have said, well, terrorists have not signed Common Article 3. Well, whales have not signed the Whaling
Convention. But it is about how we treat them and how we are obliged to treat them.").
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we are fighting for as a nation."73 Nor should we overlook the scientific fact
that at a cellular level, every tactic used in torture for the purpose of extracting
information-sleep deprivation, temperature change, waterboarding, food re-
striction-inhibits, rather than improves, memory, confession, and truth-
telling.74 So torture simply does not work. It is a profound mistake to pretend
that these are "enhanced," as opposed to impaired, interrogation tactics.7 5
In 2013, upon leaving the State Department, I left behind a memo ex-
plaining why it is "not legally available to policymakers to claim" that the
Convention Against Torture does not apply outside the United States.76 In
2015, the Obama Administration made this point explicit in its presentation
before the Committee Against Torture in Geneva, stating that the torture ban
applies "in all places, at all times, with no exceptions."77 And the Frame-
works Report that President Obama's administration issued during its last
days in office stated that "[t]orture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment (CIDTP) are categorically prohibited under domestic and in-
ternational law, including international human rights law and the law of
armed conflict. These prohibitions exist everywhere and at all times."78 In
his farewell counterterrorism speech, delivered shortly thereafter, President
Obama declared without qualification: "We prohibited torture, everywhere, at
all times-and that includes tactics like waterboarding."79 And as President
73. See, e.g., Senator John McCain, Floor Statement by Senator John McCain on Inhumane Interroga-
tion Methods (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/floor-
statements?ID=BEE3 I A68-99DE-40F6-844E-27482CBA6240 [http://perma.cc/63M5-CBDK].
74. SHANE O'MARA, WHY TORTURE DOESN'T WORK: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF INTERROGATION (2015);
see also Harold Hongju Koh, Pain Versus Gain, JUST SECURITY (June 20, 2016, 3:15 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/ 31544/pain-gain/ [http//perma.cc/HW47-U9A2].
75. See Douglas Johnson et al., The Strategic Costs of Torture: How "Enhanced Interrogation" Hurt
America, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept./Oct. 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/strategic-
costs-torture [http://perma.cc/3QXE-BE3B].
76. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State, Memorandum Opinion on the Geographic
Scope of the Convention Against Torture and Its Application in Situations of Armed Conflict 5-6 (Jan. 21,
2013) (emphasis added), discussed in CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA'S POST-9/11
PRESIDENCY 535 (2015); See also Marko Milanovic, Harold Koh's Legal Opinions on the US Position on the
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://www.ejiltalk.org/harold-kohs-legal-opinions-on-the-us-position-on-the-extraterritorial-application-of-
human-rights-treaties [http://perma.cc/AF7Q-R62Y].
77. Karen DeYoung, Obama Administration Endorses Treaty Banning Torture, WASH. POST (Nov. 12,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-endorses-treaty-
banningtorture/2014/11/12/b613 1e68-6a8c-I e4-9fb4-a622dae742a2_story.html [http://perma.cc/48MA-
X2WH] (quoting Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Tom Malinowski).
The former Principal Deputy, then-Acting Legal Adviser Mary McLeod, echoed the same notion, now em-
bedded into U.S. law: that the torture ban applies at all times with no exceptions. Mary E. McLeod, Acting
Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Acting Legal Adviser McLeod: U.S. Affirms Torture Is Prohibited at All
Times in All Places (Nov. 12, 2014), https//genevausmission.gov/2014/11/12/acting-legal-adviser-mcleod-u-
s-affirms-torture-is-prohibited-at-all-times-in-all-places [http://perma.cc/G284-NZW2].
78. PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE
UNITED STATES' USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 32 (2016)
[hereinafter FRAMEWORKS REPORT], https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/framework.ReportFinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/SS42-KSGC].
79. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Administration's Approach to Counter-
terrorism, THE WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2016/12/06/remarks-president-administrations-approach-counterterrorism [http://perma.cc/Q92S-
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Obama had explained during his campaign, "Torture is how you create ene-
mies, not how you defeat them.... Torture is how you get bad information,
not good intelligence. Torture is how you set back America's standing in the
world, not how you strengthen it." 8 0 So we were done with torture. Why
bring it back?
Happily, Donald Trump's penchant for appointing former generals to ci-
vilian national security positions seems to have prevented him from doing so.
American soldiers are trained to follow the Geneva Conventions and have in-
ternalized the norms against torture. Pressed by private letters from dozens of
former military leaders, all of President Trump's key senior national security
officials-many of them former military-publicly pledged not to follow an
order to torture anyone in an array of statements made around the time of their
appointments.8' Chief of Staff John Kelly, formerly Secretary of Homeland
Security; General Mattis, now Secretary of Defense; Mike Pompeo, now Di-
rector of the CIA; and Jeff Sessions, Attorney General, all said in their con-
firmation hearings that they would not follow an order to torture.82 As a gen-
eral, National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster had forbidden his soldiers
from using dehumanizing and derogatory language when referring to Iraqis,
declaring that "such behavior is inconsistent with the shared values that define
a soldier's moral identity."83
A president cannot implement a command that his subordinates will not
obey. So despite Trump's rhetoric, the draft torture order was not issued and
is not the law. Once internalized, the anti-torture norm is not so easily ousted.
C. Climate Change
The same could be said for the Trump Administration's well-publicized
4B2R].
80. Paul Koring, Choice of Panetta To Head CIA Likely to Raise Hackles in Spy Circles, GLOBE &
MAIL (Jan. 10, 2009), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/choice-of-panetta-to-head-cia-likely-to-
raise-hackles-in-spy-circles/article20442915 [http://permacc/VHR8-CQZJ].
81. Among other public pressure points, a joint letter from 176 generals and admirals helped to put
Trump's cabinet nominees on the record against torture. See Letter from 176 Retired Generals and Admirals
to President-Elect Trump on the Use of Torture, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Jan. 11, 2017),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resourceletter-176-retired-generals-and-adniirals-president-elect-trump-use-
torture [http://perma.cc/EWB9-GTB5].
82. Kristina Wong, Pentagon: Mattis Still Opposes Torture Despite Trump Comment, THE HILL (Jan.
26, 2017), www.thehill.com/policy/defense/316356-mattis-remains-opposed-to-torture-pentagon-says
[http://perma.cc/7SFL-UCGE]; Caroline Kenny, CIA Nominee Says He Would Disregard Trump on Torture,
CNN (Jan. 12, 2017, 1:02 PM), www.cnn.com/2017/01/12/politics/trump-cabinet-picks-oppose-
torture/index.html [http://perma.cc/P8DK-83ZY].
83. General McMaster went on to say, "[m]aybe to defeat this kind of enemy [IS] you have to be equal-
ly brutal. Maybe you have to lower your standards, but I would say that exactly the opposite is the case....
We have to defeat them in a way that's consistent with our values that reflect our society and what's expected
of our military, for our Army forces .... We have to fight them applying the principles of just war theo-
ry.... Our soldiers are warriors, but our soldiers are also humanitarians." Adil Ahmad Haque, Can NSA
Pick McMaster Bring Ethics to the White House?, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 21, 2017, 1:05 PM),
www.newsweek.com/nsa-pick-mcmaster-moral-approach-war-channels-saints-55
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statement regarding its "intent to withdraw" from the 2015 Paris Agreement
on Climate Change, the landmark treaty establishing national reduction tar-
gets for greenhouse gas emissions for all member States.84 The Paris Deal
was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC), a treaty with 196 state parties to which
the Senate gave its advice and consent in 1992.
The evolution of the Paris Deal graphically illustrated the engage-
translate-leverage framework applied by the Obama-Clinton approach to in-
ternational law as smart power. Led by Special Climate Envoy Todd Stem,
the Obama Administration did not withdraw, as the George W. Bush Admin-
istration previously had from the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, but rather engaged re-
peatedly with countries around the world to frame the global deal, including at
annual Conference of Parties (COP) meetings in Copenhagen, Cancun, Dur-
ban and Paris: with the G-20; with the countries of the Major Economies Fo-
rum (MEF); with the countries of BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and
China), especially China; and in scores of other bilateral meetings with coun-
tries large and small. Instead of treating climate change as an area without
law, the United States translated from norms inchoate in the rigid, legally
binding, top-down Kyoto architecture, which specified internationally negoti-
ated emissions targets that applied only to developed countries, to a much
more informal, politically binding, bottom-up Copenhagen blueprint infused
with stronger norms and with greater symmetry between the duties of devel-
oped and developing nations. This intense diplomacy allowed the Obama
Administration to leverage these principles into an innovative architectural
design that required a "double trigger" acceptance by at least fifty-five parties
of the UNFCCC that accounted for at least 55% of greenhouse gas emissions.
That led to the Paris Agreement, which entered into force with more than 150
parties on November 4, 2016, just four days before the election of Donald
Trump. Yet, after the initial euphoria surrounding the treaty, on June 1, 2017,
President Trump announced his intent for the United States to "withdraw"
from the Paris Agreement: an action again driven by a philosophy of "disen-
gage-black hole-hard power."
But President Trump's rhetoric launched little meaningful legal action-
for the simple reason that his announcement did not legally disengage. Inter-
national law makes clear that U.S. presidents cannot simply delete prior signa-
tures from treaties. President George W. Bush demonstrated the futility of
announcing a withdrawal under terms not designated by an international
84. This section and the next draw upon Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych 's End: A Better Framework to
Evaluate 21st Century International Lawmaking, 126 YALE L.J. F. 337 (Jan. 17, 2017),
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/KohMacroedFinal-b7ccaqrm.pdf [http://perma.cc/QF2K-8XYM], and
Harold Hongju Koh et al., Trump's So-Called Withdrawalfrom Paris: Far from Over, JUST SECURITY (June




agreement when he tried to "unsign" the Rome Statute (which established the
International Criminal Court). The "unsigning" letter his administration sent
to the U.N. had uncertain effect under customary international law, leaving
the U.S. signature on the Rome Statute, which allowed the United States to
reengage with the Rome Statute parties during the eight years of the Obama
Administration.85 The Paris Agreement only recognizes withdrawal under the
terms specified in the Agreement's text, which plainly declares that a party
cannot give notice of withdrawal to the U.N. Secretary General until "three
years from the date on which this Agreement has entered into force."86 Since
the Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016, the earliest date
that the U.S. could even give such legal notice would be November 4, 2019.
That notification would then take another year to take legal effect, meaning
that Trump cannot legally withdraw the U.S. from the Agreement until No-
vember 4, 2020, the day after the next U.S. presidential election.
Until then, Trump's withdrawal announcement has no more legal mean-
ing than one of his tweets.87 The United States has not "virtually" or
"preemptively withdrawn" or otherwise formally disengaged in any way as a
party from the Paris Agreement. At this writing, the United Nations Treaty
Depositary page on the Paris Agreement still lists the United States as a par-
ty.88 While the State Department website indicates that it has notified the
U.N. Depositary of its "intent to withdraw," a "media note" makes clear that
all the United States has done is communicate "the U.S. intent to withdraw
from the Paris Agreement as soon as it is eligible to do so, consistent with the
terms of the Agreement."89 So in the words of a quickly formed coalition of
Paris supporters, "We Are Still In." Unlike Trump's, America's commitment
to fighting climate change is irreversible.90 Under similar circumstances, the
United States was in arrears of its United Nations dues for many years, but
never quit its membership and eventually came back into compliance in recent
years.
For now, Trump's withdrawal "announcement" has no more legal force
85. Harold Hongju Koh, International Criminal Justice 5.0, 38 YALE J. INT'L L. 525 (2013),
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1436&context-yjil [http://perma.cc/YJ3L-
3V4X]. If anything, the claimed "unsigning"-announced in a letter sent by vocal U.N. opponent John Bol-
ton-only focused the attention of other parties on the U.S.'s continuing obligations as a treaty signatory not
to defeat the object and purpose of the Rome Statute under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.
86. Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [hereinafter
Paris Agreement] art. 28.1, Apr. 22, 2016, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 (entered into force Nov. 4, 2016).
87. President Donald Trump, Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-president-tnunp-paris-climate-
accord [https://perma.cc/3H7X-6SFG].
88. Paris Agreement, supra note 86.
89. See Press Release, Communication Regarding Intent to Withdraw From Paris Agreement, U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm
[https://perma.cc/V8GP-XD6U].
90. See WEARESTILLIN, https://www.wearestillin.com/ [https://perma.cc/M47V-BWRC].
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than an employee's empty threat to leave his job in three years' time. As with
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Trump initially
claimed that he plans to "renegotiate" a better agreement, but the other 190
state parties have no incentive to renegotiate a weaker agreement with a flail-
ing American administration that may already have been voted out of office
when the time comes to complete its withdrawal. In August 2017, Ambassa-
dor Haley informed the U.N. Secretary-General of the U.S.'s intent "to exer-
cise its right to withdraw from the Agreement [u]xpless the United States iden-
tifies suitable terms for reengagement," whatever that might mean.91 In its
August statement,92 the State Department further announced that the United
States would continue to participate in the UNFCCC Conference of Party
(COP) meetings, where, as a prospectively exiting party, the United States
delegation's influence will surely be greatly diminished. So if the United
States continues to participate in the Paris process and remains a state party
for the balance of Trump's first term, it has not meaningfully withdrawn; it
has only reduced its own influence by identifying itself as a lame duck. While
President Trump claimed that his withdrawal announcement "represents a re-
assertion of America's sovereignty,"93 in reality, he unilaterally surrendered
our influence over the agreement to China and the other BASIC countries,
which have reaffirmed their Paris commitments and will push the United
States to keep its own.94
While Trump has committed an egregious self-inflicted wound by
preemptively announcing his intent to withdraw, for the next three years, there
is little reason to treat that withdrawal announcement as either definitive or
final. Since the announcement, the Administration has sent confusing mes-
sages to U.S. allies as to whether it will actually follow through when the time
comes.95 Meanwhile, bureaucratic stickiness and external litigation have
slowed the pace of domestic dismantling of our Paris commitments. Many
elements of the Paris Agreement compliance plan have already been internal-
ized into the federal administrative agenda and are not so easily ousted. The
Administration's March 2017 Climate Executive Order calls for reversing
course on the Clean Power Plan (CPP), an agency rule that pushes for inter-
91. Nikki Haley, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Diplomatic Note to the U.N. Secretary-General (Aug.
4,2017).
92. Press Release, supra note 89.
93. Trump, supra note 87.
94. Geoffrey Smith, Germany and China Position Themselves as World Climate Leaders, FORTUNE
(June 1, 2017), www.fortune.com/2017/06/01/paris-agreement-germany-china-trump
[https://perma.cc/V2CC-5EJP]. For example, the Indian Supreme Court has recently backed tougher emis-
sions standards, which may improve its own intemational bargaining leverage in the years ahead. Amy
Kazmin, Indian Court Backs Drive for Tough Auto Emissions Standards, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/41b4f4bc-1483-1 e7-80f4-13e067d5072c [https://perma.cc/8FA2-77BT].
95. See Emre Peker, Trump Administration Seeks to Avoid Withdrawal from Paris Climate Accord,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2017, 5:16 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-administration-wont-withdraw-
from-paris-climate-deal-1505593922 [https://perma.cc/4VPP-K83J] (noting statement by Trump official at
diplomatic meeting that the U.S. would stay in under "the right conditions").
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state cap-and-trade and for states to build fewer coal-burning plants while cre-
ating greater capacity for renewable energy. The EPA's authority to imple-
ment the Clean Power Plan-the main federal administrative program to im-
plement the U.S.'s Paris commitments-was stayed 5-4 by the Supreme Court
in 2016 (with the late Justice Scalia in the majority).96 At this writing, the
D.C. Circuit en banc is deciding whether the EPA has authority to implement
the CPP.97 Meanwhile, the court has pointedly reminded the government that
the EPA has an "affirmative statutory obligation to regulate greenhouse
gases."98 The EPA is apparently planning to issue a proposal to undo the
CPP, along with a separate advance notice of its intent to consider a replace-
ment. This keeps virtually all options on the table-including ultimately keep-
ing the CPP in place.99 An overt effort by the Trump Administration to dis-
card the plan would undoubtedly trigger new fights about notice-and-
comment rulemaking before the D.C. Circuit, who will pass on the legality of
any new proposed agency action. In such litigation, environmental groups
could well claim that the President has failed to faithfully execute continuing
U.S. international legal obligations under the Paris Accords, with any appeals
to Chevron deference compromised by competing agency interpretations of
the same Clean Air Act provisions.
Should the Trump Administration attempt other changes, domestic liti-
gation seems inevitable. Undoing EPA rules that mandate fuel and energy ef-
ficiency standards would likely require a new regulatory process that will be
subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking and stakeholder inputs.
00 Even if
Trump's EPA tries to review the fuel economy standards, they are locked in
until 2021, at which point a new President may take office.lo1 When the
Trump EPA tried to stay enforcement of the Methane Rule and argued that its
96. West Virginia v. E.P.A., 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
97. West Virginia v. E.P.A., No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 27, 2016). The D.C. Circuit recently decided
to extend its holding of the case in abeyance for another sixty days, until October 7, 2017, and to mandate
that the EPA provide status reports every thirty days while the agency considers its path forward. Order,
West Virginia v. E.P.A., No. 15-1363 (Aug. 8, 2017).
98. Order, W. Virginia v. E.P.A., No. 15-1363 (Millet, J. & Tatel, J., concurring). Judges Tatel and
Millett, concurring in the order extending the abeyance, noted that this statutory obligation is left indefinitely
unfulfilled given the Supreme Court's stay in combination with the D.C. Circuit's order-but that the issue is
for the Supreme Court, not the Circuit, to decide. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama's Clean Power Plan.
What to Know About the Newest Legal Showdown, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (May 17, 2017),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16052017/clean-power-plan-epa-lawsuit-trump-obama-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/2JK2-L4RH].
99. Emily Holden, Trump May Replace Obama's Big Climate Rule-Not Just Repeal It, POLITICO
(Sept. 14, 2017, 7:05 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/14/trump-administration-may-replace-
key-obama-climate-rule-242747 [https://perma.cc/2KY4-WRAT].
100. See Nathan Hultman, What a Trump Presidency Means for U.S. and Global Climate Policy,
BROOKINGS (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2016/11/09/what-a-trump-
presidency-means-for-u-s-and-global-climate-policy [https://perma.cc/553E-AJJV] ("Trump can slow down
new initiatives but would have a hard time unwinding all of the processes that have been put in place over the
last nearly decade of intense work by the current administration.").
101. Coral Davenport & Bill Vlasic, Trump Using Detroit as Stage for Loosening Obama's Fuel Econ-
omy Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/trump-obama-fuel-
economy-standards.html [https://perma.cc/FM92-H3WF].
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decision to do so was immune from judicial review, the court found the action
"arbitrary and capricious" and considered it an effective revocation that fell
outside the agency's authority under the Clean Air Act. 102 The court went on
to rule that the EPA would have to initiate full rulemaking procedures to undo
the regulation and that until then the agency must enforce the Methane
Rule.103 Although litigation over regulation of hydrofluorocarbons continues,
a new agreement was recently concluded in Montreal.104 While the federal
government may seek to revoke California's waiver under the Clean Air Act,
California will surely fight to keep it. 105
If, in November 2019, the Administration should unilaterally give notice
of its intent to withdraw from Paris, new litigation would almost certainly en-
sue, arguing that the President lacks constitutional power to withdraw from
the Paris Agreement without congressional participation.106 Admittedly, the
precedent most on point is the Supreme Court's summary disposition nearly
four decades ago in Goldwater v. Carter.10 7 Goldwater concerned a Senator's
challenge to the President's decision unilaterally to terminate a bilateral mu-
tual defense treaty with Taiwan in accordance with its terms, which was ulti-
mately dismissed on political question grounds. But in Goldwater, the politi-
cal branches had not yet reached "constitutional impasse," and only one
Justice voted on the merits to uphold the President's treaty termination power,
based on the peculiar fact that the case-unlike climate change-involved
recognition of foreign governments, an issue over which the President plainly
exercises plenary constitutional power. 108 In the protracted Zivotofsky litiga-
102. Lisa Friedman, Court Blocks E.P.A. Effort to Suspend Obama-Era Methane Rule, N.Y. TIMES (July
3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/03/climate/court-blocks-epa-effort-to-suspend-obama-era-
methane-rule.html [http://perma.cc/2JZY-VMHH].
103. Rene Marsh, EPA Ordered to Enforce Obama-Era Methane Pollution Rule, CNN (Aug. 1, 2017,
12:55 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/3 1/politics/dc-circuit-epa-methane-rule/index.htmIl
[https://perma.cc/W6SS-P33T].
104. The 2015 rule was just struck down by the D.C. Circuit. Ari Natter, Court Tosses an Obama-Era
Climate Rule that Trump Had Defended, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 8, 2017, 11:20 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-08/u-s-court-tosses-one-obama-era-climate-rule-trump-
had-defended [http://perma.cc/QP7J-C4BB]; Coral Davenport, Nations, Fighting Powerful Refrigerant That
Warms Planet, Reach Landmark Deal, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 15, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/15/world/africa/kigali-deal-hfc-air-conditioners.html
[https://perma.cc/T38A-Q7SZ].
105. Robinson Meyer, The Coming Clean-Air War Between Trump and Calfornia, ATLANTIC (Mar. 6,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/trump-califomia-clean-air-act-waiver-climate-
change/518649 [https://perna.cc/VD7S-GF29].
106. The recent British Supreme Court decision in the Brexit litigation held that the U.K. government
may not use its executive prerogative powers, but rather must seek parliamentary approval, to trigger Article
50, the withdrawal provision of the Treaty of the European Union, particularly if fundamental rights are af-
fected. R (Miller) v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [2017] 2 W. L. R.
583.
107. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (per curiam) (dismissing on political question grounds); id. at 1006 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (citing the President's plenary textual recognition power as a basis for affirmance on the mer-
its); see also Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2002) (fmding the question of executive authority
to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to be a nonjusticiable political question).
108. See Carter, 444 U.S. at 996 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The Judicial Branch should not decide issues
affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a con-
stitutional impasse."); id. at 1006 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing the President's plenary textual recognition
2017] 439
Washburn Law Journal
tion, the Court recently declined a similar political-question challenge to an
assertion of the President's recognition power.109 Yet even if a litigation
challenge ultimately proved unsuccessful, the litigation could still last more
than a year, thereby pushing the national decision of whether to complete
withdrawal past Trump's presidency.
Those resisting Trump's initiatives are not simply playing rope-a-dope.
Widespread support for climate change solutions continues to grow among
other transnational actors. Through the Under2 MOU coalition, states, prov-
inces, regions, and cities around the world have pledged the common goal of
reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050.110
Already, the Governors of California, New York, and Washington
have formed the United States Climate Alliance, a coalition that will bring to-
gether U.S. states to uphold the Paris Agreement and take further climate ac-
tion.1 11  Similarly, through the Compact of Mayors, 600 global cities
have pledged to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by nearly one billion tons
annually by 2030. California alone could bring us 5% of the way to our glob-
al pledge, which is to cut our emissions by 26%-28% below 2005 levels by
2025.112 And emissions trading among subnational entities seems plainly
possible under Paris Article 4.2.113
Although President Trump claims the Paris Agreement would provide
other countries with "an economic edge" over the United States,114 business
leaders instead believe that future economic prosperity is best advanced by
remaining in and supporting the Paris Agreement. Coal jobs will continue to
be scarce. Default patterns have shifted toward clean energy and cannot be
undone overnight. New power plants are much more likely to use cheap gas
or renewables. The Breakthrough Energy Coalition, pioneered by Bill Gates,
will invest $1 billion in companies that provide affordable clean energy.115
power as a basis for affirmance on the merits).
109. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1430 (2012) (reversing the lower court's
political question ruling on the ground that the "[r]esolution of [plaintiffs] claim demands careful examina-
tion of the textual, structural, and historical evidence put forward by the parties regarding the nature of the
[law in question] and of the [constitutional] powers [in dispute]" and asserting that "[lt]he political question
doctrine poses no bar to judicial review of this case").
110. Background on the Under2, UNDER2o, http://under2mou.org/background
[https://perma.cc/U79G-MCV6].
111. Eric Wolff, Washington, California, New York Band Together to Form Climate Alliance, POLITICO
(June 1, 2017, 6:31 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/climate-alliance-washington-california-
new-york-239038 [https://perma.cc/WF7K-35CL].
112. Press Release, The Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy Announces Its Global Im-
pact, GLOB. COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY (Nov. 13, 2016),
http://www.globalcovenantofmayors.org/press/global-covenant-mayors-climate-energy-announces-
collective-impact-cities-move-paris-agreement-commitment-action [https://perma.cc/6FZG-6JBF].
113. Paris Agreement, supra note 86, at art. 4.2; See also INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING
ASSOCIATION, GHG MARKET SENTIMENT SURVEY2016 10 (11th ed. 2016).
114. Trump, supra note 87.
115. BREAKTHROUGH ENERGY, http://www.b-t.energy [https://perma.cc/XC53-JKBU]; Kerry A. Dolan,
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Through the "We Mean Business" Coalition, 471 companies with over $8 tril-
lion in market capitalization have undertaken more than 1000 climate action
commitments.116 For this same reason, hundreds of major companies and in-
vestors--including DuPont, eBay, Nike, Unilever, Levi Strauss & Co., Hilton,
Adobe, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Hewlett Packard--have publicly urged
President Trump to remain in the Paris Agreement.117 Even oil and gas com-
panies-including Shell and Exxon Mobil-have endorsed remaining in the
Agreement.1 18
Since Trump's announcement, many U.S. climate stakeholders other
than the federal government-such as states and localities1 1 9 and private
clean energy entrepreneurs-have intensified their efforts toward meeting the
Paris targets.120 These alternative stakeholders will almost surely generate an
alternative plan of litigation and emissions reduction designed to keep U.S.
emissions within striking distance of the promised U.S. Nationally Deter-
mined Contribution. As the Trump Administration waffles, the global com-
munity can keep doing what it is doing. It can disregard as legally meaning-
less the Trump Administration's prospective "withdrawal" from the Paris
Agreement, and instead look to these subnational and business leaders' efforts
to meet the greenhouse gas emissions reductions pledged by the U.S. under
the Paris Agreement. 121 Even if the U.S. does fall into arrears on emissions
reductions or green climate fund contributions, as it has done in the past with
respect to its U.N. dues, these other domestic and international stakeholders
can exert pressure to force this Administration and the next to make up the
difference in a more climate-friendly administration.
In short, Trump's claimed withdrawal from the Paris Agreement marks
just the beginning of the transnational legal process story. The outside strate-
gy of "interaction-interpretation-intemalization" is playing out even as we
watch. And inside the government, the Trump plan to undo Paris is encoun-
tering bureaucratic obstacles. While the "disengage-black hole-hard power"
faction won the day in June 2017, since then, the "engage-translate-leverage"
approach has made a comeback, forcing continued engagement a the COPs to
116. Ambitious Corporate Action Driving Delivery of Paris Goals, WE MEAN Bus. COALITION (Nov. 9,
2016), https://www.wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/content/ambitious-corporate-action-driving-delivery-paris-
goals [http://perma.cc/A8M4-S2YQ].
117. Merrit Kennedy, Hundreds of U.S. Businesses Urge Trump to Uphold Paris Climate Deal, NPR
(Nov. 17, 2016, 11:54 AM), http//www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/11/17/502425711/hundreds-of-u-
s-businesses-urge-trump-to-uphold-paris-climate-deal [https//perma.cc/8X78-WW5W]; LoW-CARBON USA,
Business Backs Low-Carbon USA, http://1owcarbonusa.org/business [http://perma.cc/RX3Z-PXKL].
118. Samantha Raphelson, Energy Companies Urge Trump to Remain in Paris Climate Agreement, NPR
(May 18, 2017, 6:32 PM), www.npr.org/2017/05/18/528998592/energy-companies-urge-trump-to-remain-in-
paris-climate-agreement [https://perma.cc/FJ36-AZWJ].
119. See Hultman, supra note 100.
120. Id.
121. Hiroko Tabuchi & Henry Fountain, Bucking Trump, These Cities, States and Companies Commit to




try to get better conditions at the margins of the Paris Agreement. Trump's
effort to withdraw has been stymied not just by career bureaucrats, but also by
his own political appointees-such as Tillerson, Energy Secretary Rick Perry,
National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, and economic adviser Gary Cohn.
All of them favor "engaging" (i.e., keeping a seat at the table) and "translat-
ing" (i.e., reading ambiguities in the treaty to permit lower U.S. environmen-
tal performance) over overt withdrawal, which they correctly see as leading to
lost leverage in the COP process. And even if the Administration ends up try-
ing to withdraw in accordance with the Agreement's terms, it will be treating
the Paris Agreement as bona fide international law that the United States has
already internalized to a surprising degree.
The main message is that the Trump Administration does not own our
climate policy. We all do. And if the federal government does not live up to
its Paris commitments, many other players can fill the gap. Even as Trump
says, "we're leaving," the rest of us can say (as the song goes) "I'm telling
you, we're not going." 12 2 There are many resisters, and many ways to resist.
Most important, the Paris Agreement was a bold global bet that devel-
oped and developing nations would all cooperate to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions through incentives to develop clean energy. The environmental
community and the global commitment to clean energy are far bigger than
Donald Trump. His administration remains visibly divided on this issue and
he has personally demonstrated little meaningful commitment or capacity to
follow through on any of his public statements. As Trump's policies and
credibility fray on many fronts, time will tell whether his so-called Paris
"withdrawal" will be just another one of them. With concerted effort, aggres-
sive innovation, and a bit of luck, in Humphrey Bogart's words, "we'll always
have Paris." 123
D. Iran
Much the same could be said about the so-called Iran Nuclear Deal,
which candidate Trump threatened to "rip up."124 The July 14, 2015 compre-
hensive nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 (known as the Joint Compre-
hensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) envisions actions by Iran, the United
States, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the allies known
as the P5+1 (the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, China, and Russia, plus the
European Union).125 After extended negotiation, Iran agreed to specified lim-
122. JENNIFER HOLLIDAY, AND I AM TELLING You I'M NOT GOING (Geffen Records 1982).
123. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1942).
124. Tim Daiss, Trump Pledges To Rip Up Iran Deal; Israelis Say Not So Fast, FORBES (Nov. 22, 2016,
1:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timdaiss/2016/11/22/trumps-iran-deal-rhetoric-israelis-say-not-so-
fast [https://perma.cc/Q422-SDWC].
125. For the full text of the JCPOA, which consists of the agreement itself and five technical annexes,
see Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. Dep't of State, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa
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its on its nuclear development program in exchange for the P5+1's undertak-
ing to lift domestic and international sanctions that had been imposed through
the United Nations.
Once again, the Iran Nuclear Deal illustrated the Obama-Clinton "en-
gage-translate-leverage" smart power" framework in action. The Obama
Administration engaged with Iran, the P4 plus the E.U., the United Nations,
and the IAEA. It translated Iran's desire to maintain a civil nuclear program
into a deal that verifiably cut off Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon while
allowing Iran to engage in certain exclusively peaceful nuclear activities-all
without endorsing a legal right to enrich-and gaining unprecedented moni-
toring access for the IAEA. The Obama team then leveraged that core norm
first with the strengthening of sanctions in June 2010,126 followed by the
gradual lifting of national and multilateral sanctions and the increasing of in-
ternational inspection to achieve an outcome that would likely have been un-
attainable through military force. As concluded, the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action reduced Iran's stockpiles of enriched uranium by 98%, forcing
shipment of 25,000 pounds out of the country. The Plan increased the time
that it would take Iran to acquire enough material for one bomb from 2-3
months to at least 1 year, reduced the number of Iran's installed centrifuges
by two-thirds, prevented Iran from producing weapons-grade plutonium, and
verified the terms of the deal with robust IAEA monitoring and inspections.
At this writing, the JCPOA seems to be fragile, but functioning.127 As
with the Paris Deal, the created regime of cooperation has become the focal
point for all interested stakeholders' expectations. Under domestic and inter-
national law, the JCPOA is a politically, not legally, binding arrangement. It
is implemented on the U.S. side largely through executive branch waivers of
nuclear-related sanctions in exchange for Iran dismantling its nuclear infra-
structure under the watch of the IAEA. The IAEA, which, as a creature of in-
ternational law, has a vested interest in following international law, continues
to report that Iran is in compliance with the JCPOA. In January 2016, Iran
dismantled much of its nuclear program, in accordance with the agreement
reached by the P5+1. Under the terms of the accord, the U.S. and the E.U.
removed their nuclear-related domestic sanctions, and the U.N. Security
Council lifted similar sanctions under Resolution 2231, which terminated and
replaced past resolutions. Meanwhile, Iran has carefully avoided acting to de-
crease its "breakout time." This suggests that Iran will not violate the deal in
[http://perma.cc/875H-XPE9]. The Annexes include: Annex I, Nuclear Related Commitments; Annex 2,
Sanctions Related Commitments; Annex m, Civil Nuclear Cooperation; Annex IV, Joint Commission; and
Annex V, Implementation Plan.
126. S.C. Res. 1929 (June 9, 2010).





a significant way, even while it tests the accord's limits, particularly with re-
spect to technical provisions-perhaps to create space to negotiate with the
P5+1 on further sanctions relief. The key political commitments in the deal
have already been fulfilled, and they are in any event multilateral, sequential,
and enforced by existing domestic sanction authorities.
Should the Iranians continue to keep their part of the bargain, the Trump
Administration would be hard-pressed to replace with nothing a multilateral
deal that seems to be working. The other partners to the deal-the Europeans,
the Russians, and the Chinese-will not default on their political obligations
just because Donald Trump wants to tear the deal up. 128 Nor will they return
unilaterally to reimposing sanctions on Iran. Meanwhile, the network of trade
deals being struck between their businesses and Iran's will likely continue to
multiply. Under this umbrella of inter-governmental cooperation, Iran's econ-
omy seems to be recovering. Iran has made deals to expand its oil fields,
build cars, buy anti-aircraft systems from Russia, and purchase dozens of air-
craft from European and American companies. Consistent with the deal's
sanctions relief, the U.S. released its hold on tens of billions of dollars in fro-
zen Iranian oil revenues. 129 Gradual re-enmeshment of the foreign and Irani-
an banking sectors continues.130 And some Israelis have become strikingly
hesitant to encourage the President to carry through on his threats to kill the
deal, which has won over advocates within Israel as a peaceful alternative that
has "blocked Iran's path to a nuclear weapon, and prevented the emergence of
an arms race in the Middle East."l3 1
At this writing, President Trump has attacked the Iran Nuclear Deal be-
fore the United Nations and, after twice certifying Iran's compliance with the
deal, announced that he would not certify it a third time because Iran had
"committed multiple violations of the agreement [and] ... [was] not living up
128. See Joshua Keating, What Happens If Trump Blows Up the Iran Deal?, SLATE (Nov. 17, 2016, 3:38
PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-slatest/2016/11/17/what-happens-if trump blows-uptheiran-deal.h
tml [http://perma.cc/4GZV-33QC] (noting that "EU governments... recently reaffirmed their commit-
ment to continue with the deal").
129. Oren Dorell, Could Trump Trash the Iran Deal? Yes, but It's Complicated, USA TODAY (Nov. 10,
2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/11/1 0/could-trump-trash-iran-deal-yes-but-s-
complicated/ 93568040 [http://perma.cc/RX4C-3WVM].
130. See Dan Joyner, The Trump Presidency and the Iran Nuclear Deal: Initial Thoughts, EJIL: TALK!
(Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-trump-presidency-and-the-iran-nuclear-deal-initial-thoughts
[http://perma.cc/HC2W-WQAK] ("If the U.S. were to re-impose or even strengthen secondary banking sanc-
tions on foreign banks, it's hard to say if this would have any effect on the pace of re-engagement with Iran
by European and Asian businesses, mostly because those businesses have already had to find ways to work
around unclear U.S. banking sanctions .... ).
131. Daiss, supra note 124 (quoting Shemuel Meir, former analyst for the Israeli Defense Forces and
researcher at Tel Aviv University); see also Carmi Gillon, The Iran Nuclear Deal Has Been a Blessing for
Israel, FOREIGN POL'Y (July 13, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/13/the-iran-nuclear-deal-has-been-
a-blessing-for-israel-jcpoa [http://perma.cc/TFT5-ECAT] (noting that "while a majority of my colleagues in
the Israeli military and intelligence communities supported the deal once it was reached, many of those who
had major reservations now acknowledge that it has had a positive impact on Israel's security and must be
fully maintained by the United States and other signatory nations").
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to the spirit of the deal."1 32 However, Trump has not gone so far as to with-
draw from or renegotiate the agreement, instead pushing to Congress the deci-
sion whether or not to reimpose sanctions. As such, the United States current-
ly remains within the bounds of the JCPOA, though the chance that it
might collapse due to U.S. noncompliance or Iranian retaliation has in-
creased.133 Meanwhile, the IAEA has now certified for the eighth straight
time that Iran remains in compliance with the deal. 134
In theory, Trump could change course and decline to waive U.S. statuto-
ry sanctions in response to future Iranian actions, but Iran could nevertheless
choose to fulfill its JCPOA nuclear commitments anyway, to benefit from the
continued lifting of U.N. and E.U. sanctions. The Trump Administration
could also unilaterally trigger the "snapback" mechanism of Resolution 2231,
which allows any P-5 member to initiate reimposition of the comprehensive
U.N. sanctions by claiming a violation, without a vote by the U.N. Security
Council. But other stakeholders may not agree that such a violation has oc-
curred. Even if the U.N. sanctions that were in place before the deal were le-
gally reimposed, it seems unlikely that the other Security Council members,
particularly China and Russia, would enforce them. However, were the
JCPOA to fall apart, the access of the IAEA to conduct inspections would al-
so disappear, and that agency would no longer be in a position to verify the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's program. Worst of all, Iranian officials,
claiming reciprocal breach by the United States, could claim just cause for re-
starting their nuclear program and build a bomb. As with repealing Obamac-
are, a Republican Congress would be skeptical of imposing new sanctions
without a better deal in place. The new Administration would simply have
created another "lose-lose" situation, blowing up a preexisting deal without
creating a new one, losing in the process its allies, its leverage, and its guaran-
132. President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy, THE WHITE HOUSE (Oct.
13, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/10/13/remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy
[http://perma.cc/SPA3-H76E] (citing Iran's violations as "exceed[ing] the limit of 130 metric tons of heavy
water, ... fail[ing] to meet [U.S.] expectations in its operation of advanced centrifuges, ... [and] intimi-
dat[ing] international inspectors"; President Trump also denounced Iran for violating "the spirit of the deal");
Julian Borger, Trump's Debut at the UN: Threats, Taunts-and Gasps of Alarm from the Diplomats,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2017, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/23/donald-trump-
united-nations-general-assembly [http://perma.cc/DP5K-EGGA]; Scott Neuman, State Department Certifies
Iran's Compliance with Nuclear Deal, NPR (July 17, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/the-two-
way/2017/07/17/537793465/state-department-certifies-irans-compliance-with-nuclear-deal
[http://perma.cc/AX57-5QWM]; Oren Dorell, Tillerson: Iran Complying with Nuclear Deal but Causing
Trouble Elsewhere, USA TODAY (Apr. 19, 2017, 3:21 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/04/19/tillerson-iran-complying-nuclear-deal/100660076
[http://perma.cc/C5EG-MJR3].
133. Mark Landler & David E. Sanger, Trump Disavows Nuclear Deal and Denounces Iranian Leader-
ship, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2017), https//www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-
deal.htmi [http://perma.cc/4TFZ-J77C]; Jana Winter et al., Trump Assigns White House Team to Target Iran
Nuclear Deal, Sidelining State Department, FOREIGN POL'Y (July 21, 2017),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/21/trump-assigns-white-house-team-to-target-iran-nuclear-deal-
sidelining-state-department [http://perma.cc/AA7E-Z5JJ].
134. Colin Kahl, The Myth of a 'Better' Iran Deal, FOREIGN POL'Y (Sept. 26, 2017),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/26/the-myth-of-a-better-iran-deal [http://perma.cc/DZ76-6YP6].
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teed visibility into the Iranian nuclear program.
For all of these reasons, "Trump's advisers are putting out signals that
rather than simply scrapping the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, . . . his
administration will try to renegotiate it to get more favorable terms."1 35 But
that cannot happen if other JCPOA participants refuse to renegotiate. Even if
talks were now reopened, the new Administration could hardly get a better
deal because the U.S. could not invoke as leverage the crushing multilateral
sanctions that brought Iran to the table in the first place. All the key Republi-
cans (e.g., House Speaker Paul Ryan and Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chair Bob Corker) see ripping up the deal as not worth the downsides, and
many in the Trump Administration are quietly admitting that the deal will not
be withdrawn.
Of course, as with the Paris Agreement, under the Trump Administra-
tion, the JCPOA could die a "death by a thousand cuts." For example, the
U.S. government could underperform its commitments under the JCPOA by
having the Treasury actively discourage third-country investment and at the
same time overplay its interpretation of Iranian commitments, with a hair
trigger for sanctions in response to claimed Iranian breaches. Because Trump
has declined to certify Iranian compliance, he has kicked it to the congres-
sional leadership to decide whether to enact expedited legislation, which
could force a snapback of the sanctions suspended under the deal. Although
this would put the U.S. in noncompliance and create great tension with other
treaty partners, Trump and Congress could blame one another and the Irani-
ans, even if the Iranians had largely lived up to their commitments.136 And
the action of hardliners in Washington could perversely strengthen hardliners
in Tehran-including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. So while re-
formist Iranian President Hassan Rouhani won re-election in May 2017, stak-
ing his reputation on the economic benefits of the deal, the future of the
JCPOA remains unsure.
What all of this again reminds us is that deals are sticky and global gov-
ernance regimes are path-dependent. As these regimes develop, they take on
a life of their own-building consensus about what set of norms, rules, prin-
ciples, and decision-making procedures should apply in a particular issue ar-
ea. Intricate patterns of layered public and private cooperation develop, and
formal lawmaking and institutions eventually emerge. These patterns create
stiff paths of least resistance from which new political leaders can deviate on-
ly at considerable cost. As important, the Iran deal shows the continuing need
to apply the smart power strategy of engage-translate-leverage. As the two
135. Keating, supra note 128; see also Kahl, supra note 134 (citing Secretary of State Rex Tillerson)
("[T]he [P]resident really wants to redo that deal.").
136. See Kahl, supra note 134 ("Iran could withdraw from the JCPOA and resume its march toward a
nuclear-weapons capability, and the region would be back on the path to a major war.")
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initial Iran negotiators put it:
The smart way to proceed would be to keep the world's powers united and the
burden of proof on Iran[:] relentless [multilateral] enforcement; enhancing sanc-
tions that punish Iran's non-nuclear misbehavior, including its missile program
and sponsorship of terrorism; working closely with Arab partners to deter Iran's
meddling in their internal affairs; and making plain our concerns with Iran's
domestic human rights abuses[ while] using the diplomatic channel we opened
with Iran, after 35 years without such contact, to avoid inadvertent escala-
tion.137
Most important, there could not be a more inopportune moment for our
President to denigrate denuclearization diplomacy and to give our adversaries
reason to doubt our willingness to keep our nuclear deals than at this moment,
when we face a bona fide nuclear crisis in North Korea.
E. North Korea
As the Trump Administration began, Vice President Pence intoned that
the era of "strategic patience is over."1 38 But what precisely does that mean:
that we have now entered an era of strategic impatience? Secretary of State
Tillerson announced that "all options are on the table" with regard to North
Korea.139 And in a frightening display of saber-rattling, Donald Trump is-
sued a statement from his vacation home threatening "fire, fury and frankly
power the likes of which this world has never seen before."1 4 0 He recently
repeated that threat at the United Nations General Assembly, calling Kim
Jong-un "Rocket Man" and threatening to. "totally destroy" a country with
whom we are not at war and that is populated by more than 25 million people,
most of them civilians. 141
I have visited North Korea three times, most recently in 2000 on an ex-
tended trip with Secretary Albright. I found the North Korean leadership ex-
treme, but not suicidal, and certainly rational enough to understand how coun-
137. William J. Bums & Jake Sullivan, The Smart Way To Get Tough with Iran, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21,
2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/opinion/iran-trump-nuclear-deal-.html
[http://perma.cc/7NUE-5VK5].
138. Merrit Kennedy, Pence Tells North Korea: "The Era of Strategic Patience is Over," NPR (Ap. 17,
2017, 10:19 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/04/17/524316419/pence-tells-north-korea-
the-era-of-strategic-patience-is-overtillers [http://penna.cc/GGT7-VGLJ].
139. Anne Gearan & Anna Fifield, Tillerson Says "All Options Are on the Table" When It Comes to
North Korea, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2017), httpsl//www.washingtonpost.com/world/tillerson-says-all-
options-are-on-the-table-when-it-comes-to-north-korea/2017/03/17/e6b3e64e-0a83-11 e7-bdl9-
fd3afa0f7e2a story.html [http://perma.cc/SNB6-YLDD].
140. Jim Sciutto et al., Trump Promises North Korea 'Fire and Fury' over Nuke Threat, CNN (Aug. 9,
2017, 4:06 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/08/politics/north-korea-missile-ready-nuclear-
weapons/index.html [http://perma.cc/AH2A-MLFS]. Senator John McCain responded, "That kind of rheto-
ric, I'm not sure how it helps." Graham Lanktree, Trump's Warning to North Korea Has Nuclear Weapons
Experts Chugging Wine, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 9,2017, 7:51 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-john-
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terproductive it would be to invite a massive military attack by the United
States. But unless we are willing to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of Kore-
an and American lives, no military option is truly viable, especially in a frag-
ile moment when South Korea is just emerging from the recent political tur-
moil of presidential impeachment. After roiling diplomatic waters by initially
declaring that he would consider recognizing Taiwan, Trump has now been
schooled by Beijing that he needs Chinese cooperation to put diplomatic pres-
sure on Pyongyang.
Because events from the Korean peninsula are evolving so rapidly-in
what some have called a "Cuban Missile Crisis in slow motion"14 2-it is ob-
viously treacherous to make predictions about what will happen next. Trump
has thrown an unfortunate wild card into the mix: his uncontrolled nuclear
rhetoric, to which an unstable Kim Jong-un could too easily overreact. When
one can no longer tell whether unhinged words have been spoken by the Pres-
ident of North Korea or of the United States, we face the terrifying prospect
that two egotistical, mercurial leaders may engage in a game of nuclear chick-
en that serves no one's best interest.
But the history of nuclear diplomacy teaches that no nation has surren-
dered its nuclear weapons under threat. To the contrary, those that have sur-
rendered their arsenals-most prominently Iran and Libya-have done so on-
ly when confronted by concerted, unified multilateral diplomacy and relief
from sanctions.143 A recent historical review found that over the last quarter
century, North Korean provocations have usually declined when diplomatic
engagement with the United States has increased.144 That suggests that the
only way out of the North Korean crisis is more intense diplomatic dialogue
backed by sanctions. Our diplomatic experts should be talking to their North
Korean counterparts almost every day.145 The goal of such sustained intense
dialogue should be to discourage further nuclear missile testing and to coax
142. David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, A 'Cuban Missile Crisis in Slow Motion' in North Korea,
N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/us/politics/north-korea-missile-cisis-
slow-motion.html [http://perma.cc/GA2Z-TL6D].
143. Steve Coll, The Madman Theory ofNorth Korea, NEW YORKER, (Oct. 2, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/02/the-madman-theory-of-north-korea
[http://perma.cc/N9HX-2FY4].
144. See Lisa Collins, Beyond Parallel: 25 Years of Negotiations and Provocations: North Korea and
the United States, CSIS, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/25-years-of-negotiations-provocations/
[http://perma.cc/YM4H-NZUK].
145. Secretary of State Tillerson recently confirmed that some kind of direct dialogue with North Korea
is in fact occurring. See David Sanger, U.S. in Direct Communication with North Korea, Says Tillerson,
N.Y. TIMEs (Sept. 30, 2017) (quoting Secretary Tillerson) ("'We have a couple, three channels open to
Pyongyang . . .' mark[ing] the first sign that the Trump administration has been trying its own version of
what the Obama [A]dministration did with Iran: using a series of backchannel, largely secret communications
that, after years of negotiation, resulted in a nuclear accord."), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/30/world/as
ia/us-north-korea-tillerson.html [http://perma.cc/ETU2-6XAT]. But it is unclear that the President himself
supports this diplomatic initiative. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TwITER (Oct. 1, 2017, 9:30
AM) ("I told Rex Tillerson . . . that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man . . .
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/914497877543735296 [http://perma.cc/3TNW-V3CK].
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the North Koreans to accept a new iteration of the Six Party Talks (the two
Koreas, Russia, China, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States), a historic mul-
tiparty dialogue that resulted from North Korea's 2003 withdrawal from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that (until its discontinuation in 2009)
modeled the kind of diplomatic dialogue that generated the Iran Nuclear Deal.
The election of South Korean President Moon Jae In, a politician committed
to dialogue with the North, raises the additional prospect of new "good cop-
bad cop"-style negotiations.
When all is said and done, Trump's bellicose rhetoric has not altered
America's main policy alternative for North Korea, which remains interna-
tional law as smart power.14 6 After vociferous initial criticism of the Obama-
Clinton North Korea strategy, the Trump Administration has little choice but
to revert to a variant of the Obama Administration's past policies. As the Iran
Nuclear Deal shows, an engage-translate-leverage approach would combine
at least six elements: containment through renewed sanctions of the kind vot-
ed on by the U.N. Security Council in August 2017147; deterrence through
coordinated U.S.-ROK military cooperation; intense multilateral diplomacy
with a special focus on North Korea's horrifying human rights recordl48; an
accelerated surveillance and cybersabotage program; and enhanced diplomatic
pressure by China, all with an eye toward eventually reviving the Six Party
Talks as an ongoing diplomatic forum to discuss a standstill to the North Ko-
rean nuclear program in exchange for the food, energy, sanctions relief, and
international recognition that Kim Jong-un so clearly craves. 149
But if this option is to have a chance, the most critical step that President
Trump can take with respect to North Korea is to continue to abide by the Iran
Nuclear Deal. For the United States cannot persuade Kim Jong-un to listen-
or use its smart power to encourage Russia, China, and our European allies to
keep the pressure on him--unless all of those nations believe that the United
States will stick by that deal, particularly if it ensures greater IAEA visibility
into North Korean nuclear activities. Ultimately, America's only realistic op-
tion in North Korea-negotiating and abiding by a painstakingly negotiated
146. Susan Rice, It's Not Too Late on North Korea, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/opinion/susan-rice-trump-north-korea.html [http://perma.cc/MX2H-
KS3H].
147. Adam Taylor, What the New U.N. Sanctions on North Korea Mean, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/07/what-the-new-u-n-sanctions-on-north-
korea-mean/ [http://perma.cc/B7AE-4ALQ]; Reuters, Here are the UN's Harsh New Sanctions on North Ko-
rea, FORTUNE (Nov. 30, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/01/un-sanctions-north-korea-coal-statues/
[http://perma.cc/4M9Q-D8GA] (noting the slashing of North Korea's annual coal export revenue by 60% as
well as copper, nickel, silver and zinc exports and the sale of symbolic statues).
148. William Tobey, 'No Good Options' on North Korea Is a Myth, FOREIGN POLY (July 7, 2017, 8:28
AM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/07/no-good-options-on-north-korea-is-a-myth [http://perma.cc/XJ3C-
KCC9].
149. Jeffrey A. Bader, Why Deterring and Containing North Korea Is Our Least Bad Option,




multilateral deal-will end up looking a lot like the "strategic patience" policy
that Trump supposedly rejected.
F. Russian Hacking and Cybersecurity
All of the U.S. intelligence agencies investigating the incident have now
agreed that Russia hacked the 2016 presidential election. They found that
Russia's President Putin did so with an eye toward undermining public faith
in the U.S. democratic process, denigrating Hillary Clinton, and helping to
elect Donald Trump.150 The multiple investigations currently proceeding be-
fore the House and Senate Intelligence Committees-not to mention the first
grand jury indictments recently brought by Special Counsel Robert
Mueller15 -all focus on, inter alia, possible Russian collusion with U.S. per-
sons around election manipulation. These investigations should in time tell us
precisely what violations of domestic law may have occurred.
Even without these investigatory findings, based on what we already
know, there seems little doubt that the Russian back violated international
law. Although the international law of cyberspace is in its infancy,152 even if
the Russians did not actually manipulate polling results, illegal coercive inter-
ference in another country's electoral politics-including the deliberate
spreading of false news-constitutes a blatant intervention in violation of in-
ternational law. The most prominent group of experts writing on cyberwar
and cybersecurity has declared that "[i]llegal coercive interference could in-
clude manipulation of elections or of public opinion on the eve of elections, as
when online news services are altered in favo[]r of a particular party, false
news is spread, or the online services of one party are shut off." 1 53 An exter-
nal attempt to distort the information that voters possess when they go to the
150. Off. of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence, BACKGROUND TO "ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND
INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS": THE ANALYTIC PROCESS AND CYBER INCIDENT ATTRIBUTION (Jan.
6, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_Ol.pdf [http://perma.cc/BZG6-U65J].
151. Remarkably, we have now learned that an FBI counterintelligence probe has been ongoing since
July 2016 to determine the extent of Russian interference and possible collusion with U.S. persons. Julian
Borger & Spencer Ackerman, Trump-Russia Collusion Is Being Investigated by FBI, Comey Confirms,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2017), https//www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/20/fbi-director-comey-
confirms-investigation-trump-russia [http://perma.cc/B5ZK-36HJ]. However, then-FBI Director Comey did
not report publicly on this, choosing instead to publicize various matters around Hillary Clinton's emails.
Natasha Bertrand, Comey Successfully Dodged the Biggest Question Looming over the Trump-Russia Probe,
BUS. INSIDER (May 4, 2017, 6:03 PM), www.businessinsider.com/comey-did-not-disclose-trump-russia-
probe-testimony-2017-5 [http://perma.cc/H9SK-W33B].
152. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, 54 HARV. INT'L. L.J. ONLINE
1, 2-7 (2012), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fsspapers/4854/ [http://perma.cc/4J78-35YG].
153. TALLINN MANUAL 2.0 ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLICABLE TO CYBER OPERATIONS (2d ed.
2017); see also Koh, International Law in Cyberspace, supra note 152, at 2-7 (stating the U.S. government
legal position that international aw applies in cyberspace; that under certain circumstances, the use of cyber-
tools may constitute a "use of force"; and that states are legally responsible for the actions of proxy actors);
see also Michael N. Schmitt, International Law in Cyberspace: The Koh Speech and Tallinn Manual Juxta-
posed, 54 HARV. INT'L. L.J. ONLINE 13 (2012) (providing a concordance between positions stated in my offi-
cial speech and the unofficial Tallinn Manual), http//www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/HIJ-
Online_54_Schmitt.pdf [http://perma.ccfT465-NAPH].
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polls also violates the human rights of the electors under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 154
While we do not yet know the full story of this sorry episode, plainly,
this is not a partisan issue, and it could well recur soon, in the United States or
abroad.1 55  Given these manifest violations, the recommended response
would be to engage-translate-leverage. Ideally, the United States would dip-
lomatically engage the Russians, seek acknowledgement that their actions
were illegal or inappropriate, translate from emerging cyberlaw and existing
human rights law to articulate the international norms violated, and then seek
to leverage from that piece of state practice to a policy outcome whereby Rus-
sia would foreswear future hacking misadventures.
Before he left office, President Obama began that process with a cali-
brated, lawful response under international law: expelling a number of Rus-
sian diplomats and closing spy facilities within the United States. Shortly af-
ter the 2016 election, the Obama Administration issued a legal interpretation.
Without mentioning Russia by name, my successor as State Department Legal
Adviser publicly cautioned that "a cyber operation by a State that interferes
with another country's ability to hold an election or that manipulates another
country's election results would be a clear violation of the rule of non-
intervention."1 56 But attempts to leverage those first two understated steps
into a broader political outcome have been disrupted by the Trump Admin-
istration's mercurial behavior. While repeatedly calling the various investiga-
tions a "witch hunt," President Trump has at various points threatened to re-
tract, or potentially modify, President Obama's response to the hacking. At
this writing, however, he still has not yet followed through on those
threats.157 Meanwhile, Congress has now passed a sweeping Russian sanc-
tions bill by veto-proof margins, and the President has reluctantly signed it. 158
154. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 27, art. 25 ("Every citizen shall
have the right and the opportunity, without . .. unreasonable restrictions: (b) To vote and to be elected at
genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.").
155. French President Emmanuel Macron claimed that he was hacked during the French presidential
campaign. Aurelien Breeden et al., Macron Campaign Says It Was Target of 'Massive'Hacking Attack, N.Y.
TIMES (May 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/world/europe/france-macron-hacking.html
[http://perma.cc/XGU4-GGGK]. According to Republican Senator Marco Rubio, the Russians tried to hack
him earlier this year. Emmarie Huetteman, Marco Rubio Says His Campaign Was a Target of Russian
Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/30/us/politics/marco-rubio-
russian-cyberattacks.html [http://perma.cc/BRZ7-JCPZ].
156. See Brian J. Egan, Remarks on International Law and Stability in Cyberspace (Nov. 10, 2016),
https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/264303.htm [ ttp://perma.cc/3XH4-DTTW].
157. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 18, 2017, 4:52 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/865173176854204416 [http://perma.cc/UY3L-QQF4]; see also
Glenn Thrush, Trump, on Twitter, Targets Obama and Russia, N.Y. TIMEs (June 26, 2017),
https//www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/politics/trump-twitter-obama-russia.html [http://perna.cc/7HiMN-
JV8D].
158. Natalie Andrews & Rebecca Ballhaus, Trump Signs-and Slams-Russia Sanctions, WALL ST. J.




One lingering question is whether the United States should now use its
cyberassets to punish Russian hackers directly, such as by trying to knock
them offline or damaging their hardware, once we meet the burden of proof
for attribution of proxy acts to official actors. 159
Unfortunately, the Trump Administration's continuing reluctance even
to acknowledge that the hacking has occurred has given cover to Putin's re-
fusal to accept responsibility for his actions. Instead, Russia has now vowed
an aggressive pushback against the new congressional sanctions.16 0 As a re-
sult, the Russian hack stands in the way of rationalizing other aspects of U.S.
policy toward Russia going forward. These include Russia's intense desire to
get sanctions lifted; the human rights issues surrounding Putin's treatment of
demonstrators and what one commentator called a "trail of dead Russians"1 6 1;
and the continuing need for the United States and Russia to remain engaged
with one another-even within a now-strained relationship-regarding such
thorny unresolved issues as Syria, IS, Iran, and Ukraine.
G. Ukraine
Ukraine is another area where, despite blatant Russian intervention, a
hard-power ouster does not appear to be a live option. With then-Vice Presi-
dent Joe Biden taking the lead, the Obama Administration sought to pursue an
engage-translate-leverage strategy: engaging with the European Union and
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in direct dialogue
regarding Ukraine, translating norms of nonintervention to make it clear that
the United States considered Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its seizure of
oil reserves in Crimea blatantly illegal, and trying to leverage these elements
into a broader "Minsk II" diplomatic process aimed at securing a fairer long-
term outcome more respectful of democracy and human rights.
When Russia brushed these efforts aside, Ukraine took matters into its
own hands and triggered its own set of interactions designed to generate legal
interpretations that could ultimately be internalized into Russian domestic
conduct.162 When the Obama Administration left office, the new Administra-
tion ceased robust engagement with Russia on Ukraine, and Ukraine's efforts
to seek international justice took on new meaning. Just before Trump's inau-
159. See James Stavridis, How to Win the Cyberwar Against Russia, FOREIGN POL'Y (Oct. 12, 2016),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/12/how-to-win-the-cyber-war-against-russia [http://perma.ccVU5V-
PVFK] (Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and formerly U.S. Navy admiral, making these
suggestions).
160. Russia Expels 755 US Diplomats in Response to Sanctions, AL JAZEERA (July 30, 2017),
www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/russia-expels-755-diplomats-response-sanctions-170730201720880.html
[http://perma.cc/T1T85-TA5M].
161. Russian and 2016 Elections: Hearing Before the S. Select Intelligence Comm., 115th Cong. (2017)
(statement of Clinton Watts, Senior Fellow, George Washington University Center for Cyber and Homeland
Security).
162. 1 should disclose that I have served as a counsel to Ukraine on a number of these litigation matters.
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guration, Ukraine brought an application against Russia before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ), alleging that Russia had violated
the Terrorism Financing Convention with its actions in Eastern Ukraine, par-
ticularly in allowing a Buk missile to enter Ukraine in 2014 that was then
used to shoot down a civilian Malaysian aircraft, MH-17. The lawsuit further
alleged that Russia's systematic discriminatory actions in Crimea against
Crimean Tatars and ethnic Ukrainians violated Russia's obligation under the
Convention for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). In April
2017, the Court issued an order for provisional measures against Russia on the
CERD issue and also made clear its expectation that Russia would both honor
the Terrorism Financing Convention during the duration of the litigation and
honor its commitments in the Minsk II process, which include stopping the
flow of weapons to illegal groups in Ukraine.163
In the face of a flagging multilateral diplomatic process and baffling pas-
sivity toward Russian adventurism by the Trump Administration, Ukraine has
been able to deploy transnational legal process as part of a broader response to
Russian aggression. A judgment from the ICJ could help strengthen a collec-
tive response to Russia's adventurism and delegitimize Putin's actions, mak-
ing implementation of the Minsk II process more likely. At the same time,
Ukraine has combined its ICJ litigation with other cases: a challenge to the
seizure of Crimean oil reserves before the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, as well as investor-state arbitrations under a bilateral investment
treaty regarding expropriation and illegal interference by Russia with invest-
ments in Ukraine.1 64
While it is too early to tell whether these various international lawsuits
will succeed, they have plainly allowed Ukraine to seize back the initiative,
put Russia on the defensive, and fill some of the vacuum left by the Trump
Administration's refusal to challenge Putin publicly. By bringing these trans-
national claims, Ukraine has been able to directly contest Russia's actions in
various tribunals capable of passing on the legality of those actions, reassert-
ing itself as an independent player confronting Russia within the transnational
legal process.
163. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and
of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.),
Order, (Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/166/19394.pdf [http://perma.cc/S6C2-
D6MF]; Beth Van Schaack, The ICJ Issues Provisional Measures Against Russia on Ukraine's Racial Dis-
crimination Claims, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 20, 2017, 2:19 PM), https://wwwjustsecurity.org/40138/icj-issues-
provisional-measures-russia-ukraines-racial-discrimination-claims [http://perma.cc/8LUN-GJJ8].
164. Gaiane Nuridzhanyan, Ukraine vs. Russia in International Courts and Tribunals, EJL: TALK!




H. Al Qaeda and IS
As I have detailed elsewhere, in its counterterrorism efforts over the last
decade, the United States has taken substantial steps to outline an emerging
law of 21st-century war.165 President Obama sought to narrow an endless
"war on terror" into a narrower armed conflict in which drones and other tools
are used to dismantle specific non-state transnational networks that threaten
the United States, such as Al Qaeda and Daesh, or IS (the so-called "Islamic
State"). Under these principles, the United States is at war not with "terror"
generally, but with a specific transnational terror network that links Al Qaeda,
the Taliban, and associated forces.
Within this narrower armed conflict, drones are a legally available tool,
not a strategy. Unlike torture, which is always illegal, the use of drones can
be lawful in wartime, depending on the precise facts regarding how they are
used.166 Drones can be used as part of a much broader collective "smart
power" response to terrorism, whereby the United States engages with its al-
lies; translates from the existing laws of war in an effort to integrate lawful
targeting and detention into a broader smart power strategy; and leverages
limited uses of force with strong legal tools, such as diplomacy, development,
and cooperative law enforcement.
President Obama detailed this approach in a wide-ranging speech deliv-
ered at the National Defense University in May 2013.167 In that speech, the
President made clear America's preference for capture over kill and respect
for state sovereignty. 168 He also expressed a commitment to the notion that
self-defense may be invoked to use force against a continuing imminent threat
(based on a necessarily elongated notion of "imminence"l69) against senior
operational leaders who are clearly determined to strike against the United
States, so long as there is a "near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or
injured."170 In December 2016, the Obama Administration finally embedded
these principles into a comprehensive "legal and policy frameworks" docu-
165. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, The Emerging Law of 21st Century War, 66 EMORY L.J. 487
(2017) (from which this subpart derives).
166. While some weapons (for example, chemical weapons) are per se illegal, drones-such as bombs
or precision-guided missiles-can be used lawfully or not depending upon exactly how they are targeted. So
if you hear someone say, "We should get the lawyers off the backs of the generals," your answer should be,
"Don't you dare!" It is the fact that lawyers are there advising the generals about what is or is not lawful that
determines whether a particular act is a lawful act of war or an illegal summary execution.
167. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University, THE WHITE




169. See Jeremy Wright, Att'y Gen., U.K., Speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies:
The Modern Law of Self-Defence, GOV.UK (Jan. 11, 2017),
https//www.gov.uk/govemment/speeches/attomey-generals-speech-at-the-intemational-institute-for-
strategic-studies [http://perma.cc/S6AA-Q8QD]; see generally Sir Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against
an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 770, 770-72, 774, 776 (2012).
170. Obama, supra note 167.
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ment, which offered a detailed exposition of how the various U.S. practices
developed during that Administration are consistent with the laws of war. 17 1
Under traditional laws of war, the United States is obliged to follow both
the law of initiating war (jus ad bellum) and the law of conducting war (jus in
bello). Under domestic law, the United States must follow the terms of both
the Constitution and the various statutory authorizations for, and restrictions
on, the use of military force.172 Since the second half of the George W. Bush
Administration, the United States has asserted that it is in a non-international
armed conflict with Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces in response
to the 9/11 attacks and may use force consistent with the laws of war and its
inherent right to self-defense. Under this theory, the Obama Administration
construed IS to be a successor to Al Qaeda, as a splinter or offshoot of Al
Qaeda Core, that entered the fight against the United States alongside other
armed groups in such active theaters of battle as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syr-
ia. 173 As a matter of international law, until its recent disengagement, Russia
said it had been invited to fight in Syria by Assad's government.174 The
United States is participating there against IS based not on Assad's consent,
but rather because it acts in collective self-defense of Iraq.
The lawfulness of our actions is an issue fundamental to the legitimacy
of U.S. counterterrorism policy. Yet based on recent reporting, it remains un-
clear how scrupulously these legal and policy rules-particularly the rules to
ensure that civilians are not targeted-are being followed by the new Trump
171. See FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 78. After this lecture was delivered, the President also is-
sued an executive order calling for regular disclosure of civilian casualty statistics. See id. at 26-27; United
States Policy on Pre- and Post-Strike Measures to Address Civilian Casualties in U.S. Operations Involving
the Use of Force, 81 Fed. Reg. 44,485 (July 1, 2016); see also Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, U.S. Reveals
Death Tollfrom Airstrikes Outside War Zones, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/world/us-reveals-death-toll-from-airstrikes-outside-of-war-zones.htmi
[http://perma.cc/6CEN-D6UK]. In my view, more steps toward transparency and standard-setting should still
be taken. See Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks at the Oxford Union: How to End the Forever War? 14 (May 7,
2013), available at http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/2013-5-7-corrected-koh-oxford-union-speech-
as-delivered.pdf [http://perma.cc/VPJ5-STC8] ("[T]he real issue. . . is not drone technology per se, but the
need for transparent, agreed-upon domestic and international legal process and standards.") (emphasis omit-
ted).
172. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(b), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
173. For more detailed discussion of the Administration's legal theory for using force against ISL, see
FRAMEWORKS REPORT, supra note 78, at 4, 11; Harold Hongju Koh, Obama's ISIL Legal Rollout: Bungled,
Clearly. But Illegal? Really?, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 29, 2014, 8:03 AM),
https//www.justsecurity.org/l 5692/obamas-isil-legal-rollout-bungled-clearly-illegal-really
[http://perma.cc/4RC2-VRG6]. A recent lawsuit, Smith v. Obama, which challenged the domestic legality of
that legal theory, was dismissed both for lack of standing and as a political question but is currently pending
on appeal before the D.C. Circuit. See No. 16-843 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) (mem.); Charlie Savage, Suit
Calling War on ISIS Illegal Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/politics/judge-lawsuit-war-isis.html [http://perma.cc/8J97-EUUZ].
But see Marty Lederman, Judge Kollar-Kotelly Dismisses Captain Smith's Suit, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 22,
2016, 8:05 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/34778/judge-kollar-kotelly-dismisses-captain-smiths-suit
[http://perma.cc/DS8H-7F4X] (challenging court's political question ruling).
174. Nick Robins-Early, Russia Says Its Airstrikes in Syria Are Perfectly Legal. Are They?,
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 2015, 5:33 PM), http//www.huffingtonpost.comlentry/russia-airstrikes-
syriaintemationallaw_us-560d6448e4b0dd85030b0c08 [http://perma.cc/LRK4-TQG4].
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Administration.17 5 Nor did President Trump's recent speech on his Afghani-
stan strategy clarify much beyond his intention to maintain an unspecified
number of troops there for the indefinite future.176 Significantly, despite
Trump's decision to lift the Obama rules for Somalia, the U.S. military com-
mander for the African Command continued to apply the "near certainty"
standard against civilian deaths.17 7 But in Yemen, by contrast, Trump lifted
these restrictions just before a disastrous raid that killed many civilians. 17 8 In
September 2017, the Trump Administration finally announced its replacement
of Obama's Presidential Policy Guidance with a new, apparently looser
framework. 179 But an initial read of that document leaves unclear exactly
how much the drone rules have really been loosened.18 0
With respect to IS, the United States is completing a huge struggle in
Mosul, Iraq, and Raqqa, Syria.18 1 But use of hard power against IS in these
strongholds also formed a key piece of Hillary Clinton's plan for fighting
IS 182-to take out these strongholds by intensifying the air campaign and
stepping up support for local forces on the ground. While these are important
steps, the Islamic State is still alive, and America has only shown again its
impressive capacity to exercise hard power.18 3 But what remains underde-
veloped or missing from the government's program are the smart-power piec-
es of the Clinton strategy, particularly pursuit of a diplomatic strategy to re-
solve Syria's civil war and Iraq's sectarian conflict between Sunnis and
175. Micah Zenko, Why Is the U.S. Killing So Many Civilians in Syria and Iraq?, N.Y. TIMES (June 19,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/opinion/isis-syria-iraq-civilian-casualties.html
[http://perma.cc/T5E8-SDS6].
176. President Donald Trump, Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South
Asia, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/21/remarks-
president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-and-south-asia [http://perma.cc/7ZXU-QR3E].
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milliken.html [http://perma.cc/P6TL-73VZ].
178. Eric Schmitt & David E. Sanger, Raid in Yemen: Risky from the Start and Costly in the End, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/middleeast/donald-trump-yemen-
commando-raid-questions.html [http://perma.cc/9SKF-V2EH] (noting that "[a]fter initially denying there
were any civilian casualties, Pentagon officials backtracked somewhat on Sunday after reports from the
Yemeni authorities begin [sic] trickling in and grisly photographs of bloody children purportedly killed in the
attack appeared on social media sites affiliated with Al Qaeda's branch in Yemen. Capt. Jeff Davis, a Penta-
gon spokesman, said on Monday that some of the women were combatants").
179. See Charlie Savage & Eric Schmitt, Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on Drone Strikes and
Commando Raids, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-
drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html [http://perma.cc/SVX5-G4LB].
180. See Luke Hartig, Trump's New Drone Strike Policy: What's Any Diferent? Why It Matters, JUST
SECURITY (Sept. 22, 2017, 8:01 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/45227/trumps-drone-strike-policy-
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Shias-both of which have contributed to the rise of IS. Nor is it clear what
steps, if any, the Trump Administration is taking to cut off IS's supplies,
money, arms, propaganda, and fighters.
The conflict against IS is taking place not just in Iraq and Syria but also
online and in the homelands of North America and Europe. The United States
must also mobilize smart-power cybertools and public diplomacy to lead a
concerted effort to discredit IS ideology online: stop digital recruitment strat-
egies; harden homeland defenses; use an "intelligence surge" to build resili-
ence at home; and make concerted individual and collective law enforcement
efforts to discover and disrupt terrorist plots before they occur. Although this
broader smart-power approach requires the new Administration to maintain
strong alliances, particularly with Canada and Europe, in his earliest diplo-
matic conversations President Trump has placed those alliances under ex-
traordinary strain, including with his ill-considered Muslim Ban.
Going forward, the most critical aspect of the United States counterter-
rorism approach will be its perceived legality. A canary in the coal mine will
be the Trump Administration's treatment of homegrown sympathizers "in-
spired" by Al Qaeda or IS and how it distinguishes criminal acts from acts of
war. Under the Obama theory, such self-radicalized individuals are consid-
ered imitators, not "members," of these terrorist organizations and hence most
fit for criminal prosecution, not military action. And the United States has
long successfully prosecuted horrific acts of terrorism within our civilian
criminal justice system.
In the months ahead, we must beware the "self-generated 9/11." Sup-
pose Trump's Travel Ban inspires a Muslim-American residing in the United
States to get a gun, shoot up a nightclub, and then post on Facebook that he
supports Al Qaeda and IS. Our criminal justice system has a long and well-
established history of swiftly trying and punishing such acts. That scenario
will present no reason to bestow any new authorities on the executive branch,
to send that person to Guantanamo, or to try that person before the struggling
military commissions on the false claim that we cannot trust "so-called judg-
es" to protect our safety. Self-radicalized criminals should be subject to law
enforcement, not warfare. Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh plotted
and executed an attack that killed three hundred people, but he was given due
process, represented, tried, convicted, and executed all within a civilian set-
ting. 184 Similarly, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, the younger Boston Marathon bomb-
er, was fully represented, convicted, tried, and sentenced in an Article III
court, during a time when the cumbersome post-9/11 military commission
184. Douglas 0. Linder, The Oklahoma City Bombing and the Trial of Timothy McVeigh: A Chronolo-
gy, F~mous TRIALs, http://www.famous-trials.com/oklacity/715-chronology [http://perma.cc/SXN4-8HKN]
(last visited Oct. 26, 2017). The recent case of the 2017 New York Halloween killer, Sayfullo Saipov,
strongly evokes the hypothetical case described in text.
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system achieved no meaningful convictions.'8 5 As the Trump Administra-
tion's counterterrorism strategy evolves, its perceived legality under both in-
ternational and domestic law will prove key to whether other transnational ac-
tors will continue to support the broader U.S. approach or rather, choose to
challenge it as illegal before courts and other transnational fora.
I. Syria
That brings us finally to the vexing issue of Syria, the greatest humani-
tarian tragedy of our time. Six years of civil war have witnessed more than
450,000 Syrian deaths, 6 million internally displaced, and 5 million refugees,
some 2 million of them children.186 I have elsewhere suggested a broader ap-
proach to this complex problem, which includes at least five elements 187: (1)
fighting the IS; (2) pursuing accountability for Assad and other leading war
criminals; (3) responses to Assad's attacks on civilians (e.g., safe zones,
ceasefires, responses to the use of chemical weapons); (4) energizing the
peace process; and (5) the refugee crisis, which has strained the frontline
states and disrupted Europe. Simply put, the debacle has grown out of As-
sad's brutality, eight Russian vetoes, and no viable peace process. Here, too,
the key question has been how to add a lawful hard-power element to the ef-
fort without undermining the soft-power strategy to solve the overall crisis.
The absence of a threat of lawful force has crippled effective diplomacy and
created a mismatch between broader policy objectives and available soft-
power tools.
Is doing nothing in Syria our only option? Or is there a lawful option
that would enable the United States to use Richard Holbrooke-style "diploma-
cy backed by force" to prevent outrageous attacks on civilians-particularly
those employing chemical weapons-and to jumpstart diplomacy, achieve a
durable ceasefire, and move eventually toward a Syrian version of the Dayton
Peace Accords? During the 2016 presidential campaign debates, three of the
four national candidates-Hillary Clinton, Tim Kaine, and Trump's vice-
presidential candidate Mike Pence-argued that the United States should use
limited military force in Syria to create a humanitarian corridor and no-fly
zone.188 The Obama Administration argued that a no-fly zone would not
achieve the humanitarian results that those who supported it desired but con-
185. Andy Thibault et al., Tsarnaev Sentenced to Death in Boston Bombing Trial, NBC NEWS (May 15,
2015, 4:50 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/boston-bombing-trial/boston-bombing-trial-jury-
reaches-verdict-penalty-phase-n359731 [http://perma.cc/L9T2-6EPP].
186. Syrian Civil War Fast Facts, CNN (July 8, 2017, 10:12 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-civil-war-fast-facts/index.html [http://perma.cc/8BV4-
7ZWQ].
187. See Koh, The Emerging Law of 21st Century War, supra note 165, at 504-11.
188. Mark Landler, Syria Draws a Rare Source of Accord in Debate Between Kaine and Pence, N.Y.
TIMEs (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/06/us/syria-vice-presidential-debate.html
[http://perma.cc/V7VF-T9L7].
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tinuously reviewed the possibility of various forms of direct intervention in
Syria. Donald Trump argued vociferously against further involvement in Syr-
ia. But on April 6, 2017, following reports that Assad had again used chemi-
cal weapons against civilians, including small children, the new President ab-
ruptly reversed course and launched missile strikes against Assad's forces.189
Although I am obviously no fan of this Administration, I have argued
elsewhere that under emerging international law, the Trump Administration's
April 6 strikes against Syria were not illegal.190 This view also seems to align
with the view of several key governments who supported the action in the
days after the attacks.191 The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Belgium have
all articulated the conditions under which they believe humanitarian interven-
tion to be lawful. 19 2 But the United States has remained quiet. President
Obama began his presidency by saying that he believed in humanitarian inter-
vention, but his administration never publicly stated a legal test. 193 In the
189. Michael R. Gordon et al., Dozens of US. Missiles Hit Air Base in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017),
https//www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-to-weigh-military-responses-to-syrian-
chemical-attack.html [http://perma.cc/D76A-LNAR].
190. See Harold Hongju Koh, Not Illegal: But Now the Hard Part Begins, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 7,
2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/39695/illegal-hard-part-begins [http://perma.cc/ZVF8-9GQZ] (explicat-
ing and applying the following test offered in Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Inter-
vention, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 1011 (2016):
(1) If a humanitarian crisis creates consequences ignificantly disruptive of international order-
including proliferation of chemical weapons, massive refugee outflows, and events destabilizing to
regional peace and security-that would likely soon create an imminent threat to the acting nations
(which would give rise to an urgent need to act in individual and collective self-defense under
U.N. Charter Article 51);
(2) a Security Council resolution were not available because of persistent veto; and the group of
nations that had persistently sought Security Council action had exhausted all other remedies rea-
sonably available under the circumstances, they would not violate U.N. Charter Article 2(4) if they
used
(3) limited force for genuinely humanitarian purposes that was necessary and proportionate to ad-
dress the imminent threat, would demonstrably improve the humanitarian situation, and would
tenninate as soon as the threat is abated.
In particular, these nations' claim that their actions were not wrongful would be strengthened if
they could demonstrate:
(4) that the action was collective, e.g., involving the General Assembly's Uniting for Peace Reso-
lution or regional arrangements under U.N. Charter Chapter VIII;
(5) that collective action would prevent the use of aper se illegal means by the territorial state,
e.g., deployment of banned chemical weapons; or
(6) would help to avoid a per se illegal end, e.g., genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
or an avertable humanitarian disaster, such as the widespread slaughter of innocent civilians, for
example, another Halabja or Srebrenica. To be credible, the legal analysis of any particular situa-
tion would need to substantiate each of these factors with persuasive factual evidence of: (1) Dis-
ruptive Consequences Likely to Lead to Imminent Threat; (2) Exhaustion; (3) Limited, Necessary,
Proportionate, and Humanitarian Use of Force; (4) Collective Action; (5) Illegal Means; and (6)
Avoidance of Illegal Ends.
[While it was] early to judge whether the Trump Administration's April 6 actions satisfy this standard, par-
ticularly points (3) and (4)[,] if they did, recognition of a customary international law 'affirmative defense'
against a claim of Article 2(4) violation would" provide an ex post exemption from legal wrongfulness.
191. Julian Ku, Almost Everyone Agrees that the U.S. Strikes Against Syria Are Illegal, Except Most
Governments, OPINio JURIS (Apr. 12, 2017), http://opiniojuris.org/2017/04/07/almost-everyone-agrees-that-
the-u-s-strikes-against-syria-are-illegal-under-intemational-law-except-for-most-govermnents
[http://perma.cc/M4PE-TfJR].
192. Koh, War Powers, supra note 190, at 980.
193. See Barack Obama, Nobel Lecture (Dec. 10, 2009) ("I believe that force can be justified on human-
Washburn Law Journal
days following the U.S. response, the Trump Administration similarly de-
clined to offer any meaningful analysis defending the legality of those missile
strikes.
In the months ahead, the Administration's lawyers should correct that
glaring omission and make clear when and under what circumstances the
United States deems limited intervention for humanitarian purposes to be law-
ful and appropriate. As I have argued elsewhere, I would favor a test that
does not preauthorize humanitarian i tervention, but rather allows it to be as-
serted as an affirmative defense that would exempt actions that meet rigorous
standards from legal wrongfulness.194 Whether or not you accept my test, we
plainly need to articulate and agree upon a better rule to evaluate the legality
of unilateral humanitarian intervention. 195 As I have argued throughout this
lecture, to build a smart-power solution, the United States must engage, trans-
late, and leverage. To solve Syria, the United States must join other nations-
including Russia-in building a sustainable peace process, organized around
lawful conduct and a durable legal arrangement, and leverage that lawful core
into a broader policy solution that contains and manages the sprawling crisis.
In arguing for a public legal rationale for humanitarian intervention, my goal
is not to have lawyers provide an excuse for unconstrained use of force in
places like Syria. Rather, the goal is to make legally available the option of
diplomacy backed by force, which would give greater leverage for meaningful
diplomacy than diplomatic talk alone.
I do not believe that the claim that, absent a Security Council resolution,
humanitarian intervention is never legally available under domestic or intema-
tional law can be sustained as a matter of law or policy. This "never-never
itarian grounds, as it was in the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inaction tears at our
conscience and can lead to more costly intervention later. That's why all responsible nations must embrace
the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace."),
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/peacellaureates/2009/obama-lecture-en.htm
[http://perma.cc/NS2M-3MDW].
194. One can analogize this situation to the Good Samaritan principle in domestic tort law. Tort law
rarely preauthorizes bystanders to use force for humanitarian motives, for fear that they will abuse this li-
cense. But if those bystanders do act in a careful fashion, for the limited purpose of preventing a significantly
worse outcome, the law will hold them exempt from wrongfulness after the fact. In such cases, we fully rec-
ognize the tension that the conduct raises with the letter of the law but invoke an affirmative defense so as not
to render socially desirable conduct illegal.
195. See also Harold Hongju Koh, Humanitarian Intervention: Time for Better Law, Ill AJIL
UNBOUND 287 (2017), https://www.cambridge.org/core/joumals/american-joumal-of-intemational-
law/article/humanitarian-intervention-time-for-better-law/05B23622D7C19B2B3BF4BD5D693BDOF
[http://perma.cc/VS62-4VEE] (from which the discussion in text derives). Although some would argue in-
stead that some forms of unilateral humanitarian intervention are "illegal but legitimate," that position
seemed dubious nearly two decades ago-at the time of the Kosovo intervention-and even less acceptable
now. I know of nowhere else in the field of human rights where we accept "illegal but legitimate" as the
permanent judgment of history. We did not say, for example, that regrettably, same-sex marriage and inter-
racial marriage were "illegal but legitimate." Instead, we moved to legalize them. We brought our very best
lawyerly skills, craft, and commitment to bear in a concerted effort to make lawful what we believed to be
morally legitimate. Not to do so simply corrodes respect for the rule of law. See Rebecca Ingber, Interna-
tional Law Is Failing Us in Syria, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 12, 2017, 11:06 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/39895/intemational-law-failing-syria [http://perma.cc/D2VH-XBWP].
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rule" exhibits the absolutist, formalist, textualist, originalist quality Americans
usually associate with the late Justice Antonin Scalia. It relies on absolutist
readings of text, as those texts were "originally understood," claiming that a
nation may not engage in unilateral humanitarian intervention because of pro-
hibitive wordings of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charterl96 and Article I of the
U.S. Constitution.197 But on inspection, this position cannot be sustained. In
both cases, this simplistic, absolutist reading cannot be squared with state
practice, inter-branch practice, or the broader object and purpose of the docu-
ment the reader claims to be interpreting.
As a matter of international law, the never-never ule is inconsistent with
the object and purpose of the U.N. Charter, whose broad purposes include
"promoting and encouraging respect for human rights."1 98 The absolutist po-
sition would allow each of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council (P5) to commit genocide against their own citizens with no basis for
another actor to intervene to protect the population at risk. It seems equally
inconsistent for a P5 member like Russia to protect a client state like Assad's
Syria when it commits war crimes and crimes against humanity against its
own citizens by insulating that conduct from international law's condemna-
tion through eight consecutive U.N. Security Council vetoes. To overcome
the manifest rigidity of the never-never rule, state practice has offered many
prominent counterexamples of de facto humanitarian intervention 199: India-
Bangladesh20 0; Tanzania-Uganda201 ; Vietnam-Cambodia (Khmer Rouge); the
U.S. and the U.K. creating no-fly zones over Iraq to protect the Kurds and the
Shias202; and of course, NATO's famous Kosovo episode of the late 20th cen-
tury.203 If we as international lawyers believe that international law should
serve human purposes-including the protection of human rights, and not just
the territorial sovereignty of states-then an immutable never-never rule can-
not survive as the legal rule governing unilateral humanitarian intervention in
196. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) ("All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity of political independence of any state, or in any other manner in-
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
197. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11 ("Congress shall have Power ... to declare war.").
198. U.N. Charter pmbl., art. 1.
199. See generally MICHAEL W. DOYLE, THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION: JOHN STUART MILL AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 110 (2015) (explaining that since Kosovo, the R2P concept "has been invoked
explicitly and implicitly, successfully and unsuccessfully, in cases ranging from Myanmar and Kenya in
2008, to Guinea in 2009, and .. .Libya in 2011"); ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2011).
200. See Gary J. Bass, The Indian Way of Humanitarian Intervention, 40 YALE J. INT'L L. 227 (2015).
201. See Daniel G. Acheson-Brown, The Tanzanian Invasion of Uganda: A Just War? 12 INT'L THIRD
wORLD STUD. J. & REv. 1 (2001).
202. See Ryan Goodman, Humanitarian Military Options for Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack: "Illegal
but Not Unprecedented", JUST SECURITY (Apr. 6, 2017, 9:56 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/39658/humanitarian-military-options-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack-illegal-
unprecedented [http://perma.cc/NH2W-65PK].




It seems similarly inconsistent with the design of the U.S. Constitution to
say-in the face of a long history of consistent executive branch practice to
the contrary-that a limited, unilateral executive strike genuinely motivated
by humanitarian purposes constitutes a "war" that, constitutionally, Congress
must always declare. As I have chronicled elsewhere, the Framers plainly in-
tended to have a strong executive operating within a strong constitutional sys-
tem capable of responding effectively to emergent external threats.20 5 Be-
cause of the superior institutional capacity of the executive to respond, over
time, inter-branch practice has inevitably shifted discretion to the President to
respond in many bona fide emergency situations, eroding the domestic face of
the never-never rule through institutional acquiescence.
As a policy matter, the never-never rule creates a bias for passivity that
guts the possibilities for smart power-diplomacy backed by force of the kind
that might motivate the initiation of a "Syrian Dayton" peace process to re-
solve the festering crisis. It promotes a bi-level bias toward inaction in the
face of gross human rights abuses at both the international and domestic level.
The consequences of that legal bias favoring passivity falls on innocent civil-
ians and guts the possibilities for meaningful atrocities prevention. In the last
five years, the only two times that Russia and Assad have been willing to en-
gage seriously at the diplomatic table have happened when the United States
credibly threatened force: President Obama's 2013 "red line" episode (which
prompted the removal of a significant stockpile of chemical weapons) and
2017. Before the April 6 strikes, the U.S. Secretary of State had little diplo-
matic leverage: he could only say to Russia's President Putin and Foreign
Minister Lavrov, "If you use chemical weapons on innocent Syrian civilians,
we will use harsh language and introduce an U.N. Security Council Resolu-
tion that you can veto for the 9th time." But the lawful availability of the use-
of-force option would instead allow the Secretary of State to say credibly:
We and our allies are looking to establish a no-fly safe zone in southern Syria or
a northern humanitarian corridor from Aleppo to Turkey, and we will enforce it,
even against Russian planes. And because you were undeniably complicit in
Assad's blatantly unlawful hiding and use of chemical weapons, we will call
you out, unless you stand down and agree to abstain from a U.N. Security
Council Resolution allowing our proposed policy solution.
Some claim that a humanitarian exception to the Charter would permit
any state to invoke claims of treaty violation or regional instability to use uni-
lateral executive force pretextually, in order to commit aggression based on a
204. In other areas, for example, state practice has helped nations to develop an elongated concept of the
"imminence" prerequisite to the exercise of national self-defense. See text accompanying note 167.
205. See generally HAROLD HONGJu KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
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claimed need for humanitarian intervention.206 But surely, states can craft a
legal rule that-particularly when applied to uncontested facts-can distin-
guish exceptional situations from pretextual justifications. At this point, there
can be little doubt that Syria presents a situation of unusual and exceptional
severity: the strikes were invoked pursuant o a century-old global prohibition
against the use of chemical weapons in a situation where European and Mid-
dle Eastern stability have been genuinely threatened by the Syrian civil war
and the ensuing refugee crisis. Others assert that legally permitting unilateral
humanitarian intervention in exceptional circumstances will lead down a slip-
pery slope. But the slippery slope runs both ways. As noted above, doing
nothing in the face of horrific cruelty promotes a skewed bi-level policy bias
toward passivity in the face of gross abuses. But able lawyers should be ca-
pable of developing narrow legal tests that hold harmless the running of red
lights by ambulance drivers without granting broad license for abuse to ambu-
lance chasers.
The most serious argument against my position comes from those inter-
national lawyers, in America and elsewhere, who don't trust Donald Trump
and his Administration to get this right. As should be clear by now, I share
this skepticism. But in the international order, there is only one United States,
and regardless of who is its president, the U.S. plays a critical role as a bal-
ance wheel of the international system. What the first months of the new
Administration have shown-particularly the repeatedly blocked Travel Ban
and the uncompleted threats to withdraw from the Iran Nuclear Deal and the
U.N. system-is that the United States is much bigger than Donald Trump.
And this lecture has shown on many fronts that Donald Trump will shift on
many aspects of his stated foreign policy aims if subjected to enough political
pressure.207
Our challenge as participants in transnational legal process is to keep the
Trump Administration's feet to the fire; to demand a Syrian policy and strate-
gy, not just a set of military strikes; and to seek a pivot to a broader smart-
power diplomacy that might resolve the underlying Syrian crisis. And if
America's President is truly serious about pursuing such diplomacy, he would
be wise to revise other aspects of his chaotic early foreign policy. In particu-
lar, he should withdraw his offensive Travel Ban 3.0; do a better job talking
and listening to our allies and working with critical organizational partners
like NATO and the European Union; dial back his bombastic rhetoric n situa-
206. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The Constitutionality of the Syria Strike Through the Eyes of OLC (and
the Obama Administration), LAWFARE (Apr. 7, 2017, 7:31 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/constitutionality-syria-strike-through-eyes-olc-and-obama-administration
[http://perma.cc/KW9M-W24V].





tions of growing tension with hostile countries like North Korea; and be more
careful about telling the truth and respecting our intelligence agencies, so that
listeners will actually believe our government when, for example, we accuse
Russia of complicity in Assad's April 6 chemical weapons strike. If he can-
not make these adjustments on his own, concerted pressure from litigation,
allies, and public opinion will be necessary to make him bend.
A final question is where to begin the process of articulating the lawful
concept of humanitarian intervention. One obvious place would be before the
Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court, which in De-
cember 2017 will consider the long-contemplated completion of the crime of
aggression.208 Many member states justifiably fear that an unnuanced adop-
tion of the crime would chill or criminalize lawful humanitarian intervention,
causing the great irony that ICC members could not use force to prevent the
very genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity that the Court was
created to punish! Perhaps the best way forward would be for those member
States who wish to ratify the "crime of aggression" amendments to do so with
a simple "boilerplate" declaration that "By this ratification, we do not endorse
treating lawful humanitarian intervention as criminal aggression." If made
by enough key member States, and supported by other Rome Statute signato-
ries like the United States, such a declaration would both allow the ICC to
complete the crime of aggression, while continuing the collective search for
global agreement on exactly what constitutes "lawful humanitarian interven-
tion" and the lawful exercise of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
As for Syria, in the so-called "Astana process," the Russians have re-
cently expressed receptivity to the notion that Iran, Russia, and Turkey would
be guarantors of so-called "de-escalation zones" within Syria, and authorized
to use any necessary force to prevent civilian harm within those zones.209
The proposal has many flaws: it does not mention chemical weapons, provide
any legal rationale, or offer a credible group of guarantors. Nevertheless, it
would make sense for the Trump Administration to seize on Russia's seeming
concession that these "de-escalation zones" within Syria are both a legally and
politically available policy option in search of a more durable solution.
Ultimately, solving the festering crisis in Syria will require far more sus-
tained and coherent diplomacy than we have seen to date from this Admin-
istration. At this writing, Rex Tillerson has overseen a baffling and troubling
208. For a detailed analysis of this vexed question, see generally Harold Hongju Koh & Todd D. Buch-
wald, The Crime of Aggression: The United States Perspective, 109 AM. J. INT'L 257, 277-92 (2015) (de-
scribing the many legal issues left after the ICC's 2010 Kampala Review Conference, particularly the com-
peting theories of how the amendments finalizing the crime may enter into force and the debate over whether
states ratifying the aggression amendments must "opt out" or "opt in" to the Court's jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression). See also Koh, supra note 195.
209. Patrick Henningsen, The Astana Process: A Possible Solution to an Impossible Situation in Syria,
21ST CENTURY WIRE (May 10, 2017), http://21steenturywire.com/2017/05/10/the-astana-process-a-possible-
solution-to-an-impossible-situation-in-syria [http://perma.cc/CS88-TW5P].
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diminution of the State Department career services.2 10 Surely, an institutional
State Department populated by the kind of extraordinary U.S. diplomats who
brought about Dayton, Paris, and the Iran Nuclear Deal is fully capable of
finding and concluding creative, durable diplomatic solutions to problems like
Syria. But what remains to be seen is whether this President and Secretary of
State will give them the mandate and discretion to do so. As so often happens
with respect to foreign policy, the questions going forward will not be about
America's capability, but about its wisdom and will.
III. WHAT'S AT STAKE
Several important lessons emerge from this rapid tour d'horizon. Amer-
ica's observance of law, international and constitutional, is preserved not just
by the federal political branches and the leaders who lead them at any particu-
lar time, but by an ongoing transnational legal process whose diverse stake-
holders elected officials do not control. Institutional habits, once formed,
prove surprisingly hard to break. With respect to international organizations
and regimes, as the old song goes, breaking up is hard to do. And in the 21st
century, the best way to produce good foreign policy outcomes remains En-
gage-Translate-Leverage, not Disengage-Black Hole-Hard Power.
When Donald Trump took office, he was faced with international and
domestic rules that created a persistent default path to compliance with pre-
existing norms. Once in place, this body of law became a "guardrail" for
politics, and early signs indicate that most of those guardrails are still holding.
A new president cannot simply have his way. Domestic constituencies and
interests with institutional authority to push back are doing so, as are foreign
allies with shared interests in preserving rules of law within a painfully con-
structed international system. Government bureaucracies long devoted to
pursuing solutions to climate change or promoting diplomacy in foreign poli-
cy do not turn on a dime.2 11 The United States has become deeply enmeshed
in many multilateral regimes, and exit from those regimes is neither immedi-
ate nor easy. Most fundamentally, many Americans want what many of these
regimes offer, whether it be a nuclear-free Iran or clean energy. So exit, if it
is attempted, will be challenged by transnational actors committed to the de-
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fault agenda. And if exit and change are made difficult, the Administration
will have to ask itself, "how critical, really, are these policy changes and insti-
tutional exits to the core agenda of this Administration?"
Whatever the new Administration may say to claim that it has fulfilled
particular campaign promises, the real question is how much it really cares
about any particular policy initiative, especially when those resisting, say, a
religion-based Travel Ban are ready to fight back together against a radical
policy change from both the inside and the outside. So even for an Admin-
istration that made many promises to win a tumultuous campaign, enough in-
ternal and external resistance to change can make the Administration's path of
least resistance staying and underperforming in existing legal regimes, rather
than absorbing the costs of actual violation of standing international rules and
exit from standing international institutions.
In battling over all of these issues, what's really at stake? Our current
system of Kantian global governance versus a cynical system of authoritarian
spheres of influence. That is why we are potentially at such a dramatic mo-
ment of change. What is being rejected now is not just a prior administra-
tion's foreign policy strategy, but a broader political philosophy of interna-
tional cooperation, of the kind that philosopher Immanuel Kant talked about
in his great pamphlet Perpetual Peace.2 12 Significantly, Kant did not advo-
cate world government; those who attack Kantian global governance as
"world government" are attacking a straw man. What Kant declared instead
was that "The Law of Nations Shall be Founded on a Federation of Free
States"2 13: that law-abiding nations should live in a law-governed internation-
al society, where sovereign states that respect basic values-democracy, the
rule of law, individual freedom, and the mutual advantages derived from
peaceful intercourse-engage in mutual discourse based on respect for do-
mestic and international rule of law in order to achieve shared outcomes. Or,
otherwise put, Engage, Translate, and Leverage.
Kantian global governance is a system that the United States helped to
create and sustain since World War II. It formed the basis for the United Na-
tions-our system to end war and promote human rights-and the Bretton
Woods system to govern international monetary flows, trade, and develop-
ment through the IMF, WTO, and World Bank-our system to end global de-
pression and poverty. Kantian global governance has allowed the United
States to lead a group of like-minded nations to organize an ambitious multi-
lateral assault on all manner of global problems: e.g., climate change, through
the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change; intellectual property,
through the World Intellectual Property Organization; and global health,
through the World Health Organization. For more than seventy years, the
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United States has been the driver, the balance wheel of this Kantian govern-
ance system, whether it be in the United Nations, the World Trade Organiza-
tion, the Paris Climate Change Regime, or the Iran Nuclear Deal.
But as I speak, all of these historical experiments, as well as the Brexit-
led attack on the European Union, are under threat of displacement by a coun-
ter-model of Orwellian spheres of influence. Remember the nasty and brutish
world that George Orwell described in his haunting book 1984: a world in
which cynical global mega-powers-indistinguishable from one another in
their authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and commitment to disinformation and
"fake news"-violate human rights and the rule of law within their own
spheres, while making cynical alliances and manipulating public opinion to
make today's adversaries tomorrow's allies.2 14 Unlike Kant, Trump does not
seem to believe in universal rights or accept the notion that everyone can rise
together. His "America First" strategy, most recently repeated in his first
United Nations speech, grimly views our interactions with the world as zero-
sum, an approach that inevitably promotes reciprocal self-centeredness on the
part of other powerful nations.
Will we head in this Orwellian direction? Will Donald trump interna-
tional law? Will he change the process or will it change him? Will consistent
"rope-a-dope" resistance force him to adapt and change course in a more in-
ternational law-friendly direction? And as his fragile coalition comes under
stress, will it solidify or crumble?
The answer to all of these questions, of course, is "we shall see." But the
early signs give reason for optimism. As this review has chronicled, in some
issue areas, bold public acts of resistance are playing a critical role in block-
ing Trump's initiatives. In other areas, bureaucratic inertia, path dependence,
overly high opportunity costs, and international realpolitik realities have
posed powerful constraints. In many of these areas, both heroic and mundane
constraints can be seen at work. But the revealed challenge for those who
wish to join forces actively to resist is to search for, find, and apply political
pressure to those critical pressure points within transnational legal process
that can be strategically leveraged by anti-Trump actors.
Is the rope-a-dope working? While we are still in the early months of
this Administration, here's the tally so far. Close to fifty executive orders with
little real impact. Twenty senior officials resigned. Two stunning losses on
repealing Obamacare. Travel Ban: thrice blocked in the lower courts. Tor-
ture order: never issued. Climate: a claimed withdrawal that will not go into
effect until after the next presidential election. Iran Nuclear Deal: under
siege, but still in place. North Korea: saber-rattling and rhetoric, but no real
change in policy. Russian hacking: continued turmoil, many active investiga-
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tions, and indictments coming. Ukraine: mobilizing transnational legal pro-
cess on its own. IS and Syria: borrowing from the Clinton playbook but lack-
ing the "smart power" plan that might achieve durable outcomes. Many
strained alliances, both with foreign governments and with Trump's Republi-
can allies. Little progress on Trump's core agenda. And all of that less than a
quarter way into a four-year term.
In closing, I am reminded of an old joke by comedian Mel Brooks, play-
ing a 2000-year-old man. That super-elderly man is asked, "Before the Al-
mighty, did you believe in any superior being?" His answer: "There was this
guy, Phil; and we used to plead, 'Oh Phil, don't kick us; don't beat us; don't
hurt us.' Until one day, lightning came out of the sky and struck Phil down.
At which point we realized, 'There's something bigger than Phil!' "215
Well, in the same way, there's something bigger than Donald Trump.
He does not own transnational legal process. He is just another player in it.
What this lecture should remind you is that so are we, as are all the other
transnational actors I have mentioned.
In sketching this picture, I am intensely mindful that the fight is just be-
ginning. Inevitably, a "rope-a-dope" strategy wears down both sides. While
the resistance has won impressive early victories, the constant battering by the
Trump Administration may have a longer-term corrosive effect on the health
and well-being of our democratic institutions. And while in Donald Trump's
America, legal guardrails may be keeping the traffic of power more or less on
the road of law, in other countries with weaker democratic institutions and
civil society, the news is far darker. China, Russia, and illiberal democracies
like Hungary, Poland, and Venezuela are emerging not just as spoilers of, but
as active predators within, the liberal international order. Perhaps our postwar
alliance system can preserve and continue to build the international order by
keeping these illiberal states within the guardrails. But as I write, pressure on
human rights activism is visibly growing, not just in these states, but in other
democratic states throughout Europe, as well as India. The language of hu-
man rights and democratic sovereignty are increasingly being turned against
the whole idea of external monitoring of domestic compliance with interna-
tional law.216
So the game is on, and the stakes are high. The fight is in its early
rounds, and the transnational legal saga is just beginning.
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As you all know from living here in Topeka, Kansas, the home of Brown
v. Board-as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. used to remind us, the arc of history
is long, but it bends toward justice.2 17 But it doesn't bend by itself. We are
all participants in transnational legal process. So it is up to us, as the story of
this Administration unfolds, to continue to fight to help the arc of history bend
in the right direction.
Thank you all very much for listening.
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